

Perspectives on societal polarization

Marcus Gercke & Jan Delhey

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Research motivation & Problem definition

Relevance: polarization ...

- fosters social, political and cultural **conflicts** up to riots and civil wars
(e. g. Esteban & Ray 2008, Permanyer 2012, Reynal-Querol 2002, Teney & Rupieper 2023)
- is fundamental for social & political **cleavages**
(e. g. Borbáth et al. 2023, Herold et al. 2023, Lux et al. 2022, Taskforce FGZ-Datenzentrum 2022)
- is a **much-discussed topic**, e. g. in debates on the middle classes (e. g. Mau, 2022, Reckwitz, 2019)

Wide variety of polarization sub-concepts

- e. g. income-, ethnic-, religious-, political-, affective-, social-, health-, or spatial-polarization
(Bauer 2019)

Definition

- **no uniform definition** & measurement
- is actually **distinct from neighbouring phenomena** such as inequality and fractionalisation

(Duclos & Taptué 2015, Esteban & Ray 1994)

→ Question

How different empirical perspectives on societal polarization can be classified?

Basic conception of polarization

polarization is reflected in **frequency distributions** of attributes or characteristics (e. g. income, attitudes, values, etc.)

Overall/ mass Polarization¹

= degree of **spread around the median** of a distribution within the total population (**bipolarity**)

Group Polarization²

- High degree of **dissimilarity between groups**
- High degree of **similarity within each group**
- Small number of **significantly sized groups**




Figure 1:
Normal distribution




Figure 2:
Mass polarization




Figure 3:
Low group polarization




Figure 4:
High group polarization

¹e. g. Lelkes 2016; ²adapted from Esteban & Ray 1994, p. 824

Common axioms & distinction from neighbouring concepts

1. Greater **dispersion** around the median: polarization \uparrow ; inequality \uparrow (Figure 1)
2. Greater **bipolarity**: polarization \uparrow ; inequality \downarrow (Figure 2)
3. Unipolar **concentration**: polarization \downarrow ; inequality \uparrow (Figure 3)
4. Greater **fractionalization** \uparrow : polarization \downarrow (Figure 2, reversed: $B \rightarrow A$)




Figure 1:
Increase in **dispersion**




Figure 2:
Increase in **bipolarity**




Figure 3:
Increase in **unipolar concentration**

Societal polarization: A heuristic

Dimension

(A) Manifest polarization

I. Analysis of distributions of relevant attributes (e. g.: Income, status, attitudes, affects towards others, etc.)

II. Defined by researcher:
Overall or between groups

III. Defined by researcher:
Topic (e. g.: Social, political, cultural)

IV. State: Cross sectional data
Process: Time series/longitudinal data

(B) Perceived polarization

I. Ask for perceived polarization
(e. g.: *How divided on key societal issues you believe your country is today?*)

II. Built in question:
Overall or between groups

III. Built in question:
Topic (e. g.: Social, political, cultural)

IV. Built in question:
State: Cross sectional data
Process: Time series/longitudinal data
Perceived development: In question

Application examples

	SOCIAL POL.	POLITICAL POL.	CULTURAL POL.
Author, short title	Gercke & Delhey 2023, Life satisfaction inequality & polarization in Europe*	Reiljan 2020, Affective polarization in European party systems	Akaliyski 2019, Convergence of cultural values among EU member states & candidates
I. Access	Manifest	Manifest	Manifest
II. Subject	Overall & income group polarization in 30 European countries	Group polarization: Partisans, nested in 23 European countries	Group polarization btw. 30 European countries
III. Object	Life satisfaction	Closeness to a party, Interparty hostility	Emancipative & secular value indices
IV. Time	Process: Time series data 2002-2018	State & Process: Comparison 2005 & 2016	Process: Time series data 1992-2008
Measure	Disagreement Index, Dissimilarity Index	Affective polarization index (AP-Index)	Dyadic data regression
Results	Decrease of overall pol., Increase of group pol.	AP highly present in European party systems	Polarization btw. EU members & non-members

*Work in progress.

Own research: Life satisfaction polarization in Europe

Question

How did **polarization of life satisfaction (LS)** in Europe develop, and what determinants affect it?

Polarization measures

$LS_{\text{Polarization}}$ Disagreement Index: **DAgrm.** [0,1] 1 – Van der Eijks (2001) Agrm. A

$LS_{\text{Group Polarization}}$ Dissimilarity Index: **DI** [0,1] 1 – OVL (Goldstein 1995)

→ 1st vs. 5th Net. equ. income quintile

Determinants

Wealth: Log. GDP p.c. (PPP)

Income inequality: Gini

Social Trust: Overall trust

LGBT+ Rights: LGBT+ Rights Index

Data on life satisfaction → ESS 1-9 (2002-2018)

→ World Bank

→ SWIID (Solt 2020)


→ ESS 1-9

→ Velasco 2020

Total:

N = 510, n = 30, t = 17

Change of Life Satisfaction Polarization 2002-2018




Measurement of Polarization: 1 - Van der Eijks (2001) Agreement A [0,1], 0 = perfect unimodality (concentration), 1 = perfect bimodality (absolute polarization), 0.5 = perfect uniformity, Correlation over time: $r(508) = -.097, p = .029$.

Chart: Delhey, Gercke 2023 • Source: ESS Cumulative data file • Created with Datawrapper

Change of Life Satisfaction Group-Polarization 2002-2018

Dissimilarity of the life satisfaction distribution between persons from the 1st and 5th quintile of net equivalent income.



Dissimilarity Measurement: 1 - OVL Coefficient (Goldstein 1995), 0 = no polarization, 1 = absolute polarization, Correlation over time: $r(508) = .174, p < 0.001$.

Chart: Delhey, Gercke 2023 • Source: ESS Cumulative data file • Created with Datawrapper

Overall/ mass Polarization

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
l. GDP p.c.	-0.115*** (0.014)	-0.081*** (0.011)	-0.108*** (0.016)
Gini	0.004** (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)
Trust		-0.026*** (0.005)	
LGBT Rights			-0.002 (0.002)
Year	0.003*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)
Observations	510	510	510
Countries	30	30	30
F-Stat.	40.10	66.40	31.52
Adj. R-squared	0.708	0.799	0.712

Note: GDP p.c. (PPP) was logarithmized, l. GDP p.c., Gini and LGBT+ Rights Index (LGBT) were lagged by one year (t-1), Robust standard errors in parentheses, t = 17 years, *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1

Income Group Polarization (Quintiles)

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
l. GDP p.c.	-0.020 (0.035)	-0.030 (0.046)	-0.039 (0.038)
Gini	0.001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)
Trust		0.008 (0.013)	
LGBT Rights			0.006 (0.004)
Year	0.003* (0.002)	0.004† (0.002)	0.003† (0.002)
Observations	510	510	510
Countries	30	30	30
F-Stat.	3.502	2.773	3.739
Adj. R-squared	0.0502	0.0562	0.0786

Note: GDP p.c. (PPP) was logarithmized, l. GDP p.c., Gini and LGBT+ Rights Index (LGBT) were lagged by one year (t-1), Robust standard errors in parentheses, t = 17 years, *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1

Take-away messages

- Polarization is conceptually & empirically distinct from neighbouring concepts like inequality or fractionalization
- The **4-dimensional heuristic** reveals commonalities and differences of societal polarization
- **Overall/ Mass polarization** \neq **group polarization**, e. g.
 - Much progress towards a more equal distribution of life satisfaction overall vs.
 - Growing polarization in life satisfaction between high and low income groups
→ Especially in the most affluent countries

Research recommendations

- Look at overall & group polarization for full picture
- If possible, research polarization as a process, or compare units (e. g. countries)
- “More/less” polarization is easier to establish than “yes/no” polarization (latter: threshold problem)

Thank you very much for your attention!

Ideas and suggestions?

Email to marcus.gercke@ovgu.de or jan.delhey@ovgu.de

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