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# ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRATION AND MIGRATION POLICIES IN HUNGARY AND EUROPE (2014–18)<sup>1</sup>

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The aim of this chapter is to investigate public opinion on migration generally, and more specifically attitudes toward asylum seekers during the migration crisis affecting Europe. The time frame of our analysis is 2014 to 2018, as we analyse the public attitudes of Hungarian and European citizens before, during and after the peak of the migration crisis.

The structure is as follows: first, international longitudinal data will be presented, drawing on European comparative surveys during 2014–18; secondly, we focus our attention on the so-called Visegrád countries and the joint research that took place in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary (the V4 countries) between August and October 2015. Thirdly, we zoom in on the Hungarian data related to asylum seekers arriving from different source countries and analyse the social basis of the migration-related question. Finally, we summarize our results.

## **1. International trends**

The Eurobarometer survey regularly asks European citizens about the most important issues facing the EU and their own countries. In *Figures 1* and *2* we summarize the top six concerns at the European and national level.


The issue of immigration was perceived to be increasingly important between 2014 and 2016 (rising from 21 to 48 per cent of those questioned). In both 2017 and spring 2018, immigration was seen as the most important issue facing the EU, averaging 38 per cent of mentions. The highest figures were recorded in Estonia (62 per cent), the Czech Republic (58 per cent) and Hungary (56 per cent) – given that the EU-28 average was 38 per cent, we may

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say that in those three countries immigration was perceived to be a huge burden on the European Union. It is important to mention, however, that immigration was perceived to be the second most important concern in all the remaining Member States, except Portugal (where only 16 per cent of people mentioned it as one of their two top concerns).

Figure 1 ‘What do you think are the two most important issues facing the EU at the moment?’, per cent, EU-28




Notes: For further, country-specific data, see Eurobarometer series at: <http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm>

Source: based on Eurobarometer series (2014–18); only top 6 concerns (out of 13) are shown (own editing).

In line with the issue of immigration, terrorism was perceived to be an increasingly important concern between 2014 and 2017 (mentions at the EU level increased from 6 per cent to 44 per cent). Most recently, in 2018, it was mentioned by 29 per cent of Europeans and is in first position in seven countries (compared to the data for 2017, that is a 15 percentage point decrease). The highest fear of terrorism was perceived in Lithuania (49 per cent), Cyprus (44 per cent) and Ireland (40 per cent). Furthermore, terrorism was also much cited, though in second position, in the Czech Republic (47 per cent), Bulgaria and Poland (both 42 per cent) and Latvia (41 per cent). In sum, terrorism is perceived to be the second most important issue in the EU; it is worth mentioning that the Member States whose populations are most concerned about this issue are not those countries that are most affected by terrorism.

The second question referred to the most important issues in respondents' own countries (*Figure 2*).

Figure 2 'What do you think are the two most important issues facing your country at the moment?', per cent, EU-28



Notes: For further, country-specific data, see Eurobarometer series at: <http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm>

Source: based on Eurobarometer series (2014–18); only top 6 concerns (out of 13) are shown (own editing).

According to the most recent data on the 'top concerns' of Member States, in 2018 unemployment and health and social security are seen as the most important issues facing the EU at the moment, while immigration remains in third place (with 21 per cent of mentions). Health and social security reached a new high, occupying second place for the first time since spring 2007. While the issue of immigration was seen as a major concern in 2016 (28 per cent mentioned it as one of the top two issues – almost as many people as mentioned unemployment), that is not the case anymore. Across the European Union, on average only one respondent in five listed immigration as one of the top two issues facing their own country.

The European Social Survey (ESS) is an academically driven, cross-national survey that has been conducted across Europe since its establishment in 2001. Every other year, face-to-face interviews are carried out with newly selected, cross-sectional samples. The survey measures the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of diverse populations in more than 30 nations. The data

presented in this chapter come from the fieldwork for 2014 (ESS Round 7) and 2016 (ESS Round 8); the former round was carried out just before the migration crisis began in Europe, while the latter just after it peaked.

Table 1 shows how countries differ from each other regarding the proportion of those who think that immigration is generally ‘*really bad*’<sup>2</sup> for the country’s economy.

Table 1 *Proportion of those who find immigration really bad for the country’s economy (per cent)*

	2014	2016	Change
Hungary	17.3	28.7	11.4
Estonia	9.0	12.7	3.7
Austria	11.2	14.0	2.7
Lithuania	5.6	8.1	2.5
Israel*	10.8	12.7	1.9
Slovenia	17.0	18.8	1.7
Czech Republic	15.5	16.8	1.2
Sweden	3.9	4.4	0.6
Switzerland	2.6	2.8	0.2
Finland	6.4	6.3	0.0
Poland	10.5	10.4	-0.1
France	12.8	12.5	-0.4
Germany	5.1	4.7	-0.4
Spain	8.3	7.3	-1.0
Norway	4.1	3.0	-1.0
<b>Average</b>	<b>9.5</b>	<b>8.4</b>	<b>-1.1</b>
Netherlands	5.9	3.7	-2.1
Ireland	10.6	8.1	-2.5
Belgium	12.3	8.0	-4.3
Portugal	12.1	6.8	-5.3
United Kingdom	12.1	6.4	-5.7

Notes: Countries with missing data were excluded from the comparison: Denmark, Russian Federation, Iceland and Italy.

\* Israel also taking part in European Social Survey (ESS).

Source: European Social Survey (ESS): <https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>

<sup>2</sup> The exact question was ‘*Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]’s economy that people come to live here from other countries?*’ Answers were given on a scale of 0–10, where 0 means bad for the economy and 10 means good for the economy. In the analysis ‘*really bad*’ means 0 and 1.

In 2014, the EU average was 9.5 per cent, with the highest levels measured in Hungary (17.3 per cent), Slovenia (17 per cent) and the Czech Republic (15.5 per cent). The lowest rates of those who found immigration very bad for the country were in Switzerland (2.6 per cent), Sweden (3.9 per cent) and Norway (4.1 per cent). In 2016, the EU average decreased slightly to 8.4 per cent; the biggest change was measured in Hungary, where the proportion of those who thought that immigration was bad had soared to 28.7 per cent. Higher levels of negativity in 2016 than in 2014 were also found in Estonia, Austria and Lithuania. The biggest fall was experienced in the United Kingdom (from 12.1 per cent to 6.4 per cent), Portugal (12.1 per cent to 6.8 per cent) and Belgium (12.3 per cent to 8 per cent) (*Table 1*).

*Table 2 Proportion of those who think that the country's cultural life is really undermined by immigrants (per cent)*

	2014	2016	Change
Hungary	6.0	22.0	16.0
Czech Republic	13.4	20.6	7.2
Estonia	6.3	10.8	4.5
Lithuania	6.7	10.6	3.8
Slovenia	8.5	11.9	3.4
Austria	11.0	14.0	3.0
Israel*	7.0	9.8	2.8
France	9.2	11.4	2.2
Germany	4.2	5.4	1.2
Poland	4.8	5.7	0.9
Sweden	1.4	2.1	0.7
<b>Average</b>	<b>6.7</b>	<b>7.3</b>	<b>0.6</b>
Netherlands	2.8	3.2	0.5
Finland	2.0	2.0	0.0
Norway	4.5	4.0	-0.6
Spain	4.5	3.9	-0.6
Belgium	5.1	4.3	-0.8
Switzerland	3.5	2.5	-0.9
Ireland	7.2	5.4	-1.8
Portugal	8.2	5.4	-2.8
United Kingdom	11.6	7.1	-4.5

*Notes:* Countries with missing data were excluded from the comparison: Denmark, Russian Federation, Iceland and Italy.

\* Israel also taking part in European Social Survey (ESS).

*Source:* European Social Survey (ESS): <https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>

*Table 2* summarizes public opinion in European countries about the impact of immigration on each country's cultural life. In 2014, on average 6.7 per cent of respondents felt that the country's cultural life was '*really undermined*'<sup>3</sup> by immigrants. In the Czech Republic (13.4 per cent), the United Kingdom (11.6 per cent) and Austria (11 per cent) the figure was much higher than average, implying a strong negative attitude toward the cultural impact of immigration. Sweden (1.4 per cent), Finland (2 per cent) and the Netherlands (2.8 per cent) had the lowest proportions of respondents agreeing that their country's 'cultural life is really undermined by immigrants'. In 2016, Hungary (22 per cent) and the Czech Republic (20.6 per cent) had the highest proportions of those who shared this negative opinion; moreover, the increase in Hungary over two years was dramatic (6 per cent to 22 per cent), especially in comparison to the EU average, which hardly changed between 2014 and 2016 (*Table 2*).

*Table 3* and *4* show data on how the people of different European countries feel about immigrants of the same race/ethnic group as the majority population (*Table 3*) and immigrants of a different race or ethnic group (*Table 4*).<sup>4</sup> As in the previous cases, the proportion of the *most negative* responses is shown for both time periods in each country.

On the issue of immigration by people of the same race/ethnic group, in Europe in 2014 some 6 per cent of the total population on average would not allow it. The figure was highest in the Czech Republic (17.4 per cent), Hungary (11.8 per cent), Portugal (10.7 per cent) and Ireland (10 per cent). Those countries with the lowest proportion of respondents who would not allow any such immigration were Sweden (0.5 per cent), Norway (0.4 per cent), Switzerland (1.4 per cent) and Germany (1.5 per cent). By 2016, the figure had more than doubled in Hungary (to 24.6 per cent) and there had been a slight increase in Lithuania (from 8.8 per cent to 13.8 per cent) (*Table 3*).

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<sup>3</sup> The exact question was '*And, using this card, would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?*' Answers were given on a scale of 0–10, where 0 meant the cultural life was undermined and 10 meant the cultural life was enriched. In the analysis '*Really undermined*' means 0 and 1.

<sup>4</sup> '*Now, using this card, to what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country]'s people to come and live here?*' and '*How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people?*'

Table 3 *Proportion of those who would allow no immigrants of the same race/ethnic group as the majority population (per cent)*

	2014	2016	Change
Hungary	11.8	24.6	12.8
Lithuania	8.8	13.8	5.0
Poland	6.4	9.9	3.4
Czech Republic	17.4	20.7	3.4
Israel*	9.2	12.1	2.9
Switzerland	1.4	2.7	1.2
Austria	7.1	8.3	1.2
France	5.1	6.0	1.0
Estonia	4.5	4.5	0.0
Germany	1.5	1.5	0.0
Norway	0.7	0.7	0.0
Sweden	0.5	0.4	-0.1
<b>Average</b>	<b>6.0</b>	<b>5.9</b>	<b>-0.1</b>
Slovenia	6.3	5.7	-0.6
Ireland	10.0	8.9	-1.1
Finland	2.4	1.1	-1.3
Netherlands	5.1	2.8	-2.3
Spain	7.7	5.4	-2.3
Belgium	7.3	4.7	-2.6
United Kingdom	9.2	5.6	-3.7
Portugal	10.7	5.0	-5.8

Notes: Countries with missing data were excluded from the comparison: Denmark, Russian Federation, Iceland and Italy. Available responses ranged from 'allow all of them' to 'allow none of them'.

\* Israel also taking part in European Social Survey (ESS).

Source: European Social Survey (ESS): <https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>

As far as immigration by people of a different race/ethnic group is concerned, in 2014 on average 10.6 per cent of the total population in Europe would not permit any such immigration. Not surprisingly, the figure is much higher than for immigration by people of the same race/ethnic group. In 2014, the proportion of those who would not permit such immigration was three times the European average in Hungary (31.5 per cent), the Czech Republic (29.3 per cent) and Israel (31.1 per cent). The figure was much lower than the average in Sweden (0.5 per cent), Norway (1.7 per cent), Switzerland (3.9 per cent) and Germany (4.3 per cent). By 2016, the figure had increased most in Hungary (to 45.6 per cent), meaning that virtually every second Hungarian respondent would not allow any immigrants of a different race/ethnic group. A significant increase was also measured in Lithuania (from 13.5 per cent to 21.5 per cent).

By contrast, over the two years under review the figure declined significantly in Portugal (from 15.8 per cent to 9.2 per cent), the United Kingdom (13.1 per cent to 7.6 per cent) and Spain (11 per cent to 7 per cent). There was no change in the European average (*Table 4*).

Table 4 *Proportion of those who would allow no immigrants of a different race/ethnic group to the majority population (per cent)*

	2014	2016	Change
Hungary	31.5	45.6	14.1
Lithuania	13.5	21.5	8.0
Poland	10.4	17.9	7.5
Czech Republic	29.3	36.4	7.1
Estonia	13.5	19.1	5.6
Austria	13.6	18.9	5.3
Switzerland	3.9	5.4	1.5
Slovenia	10.2	11.4	1.2
France	10.2	11.1	0.9
Sweden	0.5	0.7	0.2
Israel*	31.1	31.2	0.1
Germany	4.3	4.3	0.0
Norway	1.7	1.6	0.0
<b>Average</b>	<b>10.6</b>	<b>10.5</b>	<b>-0.1</b>
Netherlands	6.2	4.4	-1.8
Ireland	13.9	11.9	-2.0
Finland	8.3	5.9	-2.5
Belgium	12.4	8.9	-3.4
Spain	11.0	7.0	-4.0
United Kingdom	13.1	7.6	-5.5
Portugal	15.8	9.2	-6.5

*Notes:* Countries with missing data were excluded from the comparison: Denmark, Russian Federation, Iceland and Italy. Available responses ranged from ‘allow all of them’ to ‘allow none of them’.


\* Israel also taking part in European Social Survey (ESS).

*Source:* European Social Survey (ESS): <https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>

## 2. Migration-related attitudes and fear in the Visegrád countries

Comparing attitudes to the immigration of people from other EU Member States and those from outside the EU, it is obvious that respondents in all V4 countries are much more concerned about third-country immigrants than intra-EU migration (*Figure 3*).

Figure 3 *Immigration of people from other EU Member States and from outside the EU (2014–18)*



Notes: Total negative means the sum of fairly and very negative answers. The exact questions were: ‘Please tell me whether each of the following statements evokes a positive or negative feeling for you. Immigration of people from other EU Member States/ Immigration of people from outside the EU’.

Source: based on Eurobarometer series (2014–18) (own editing).

Compared to the EU average, respondents from the V4 countries were more negative toward both aspects of migration (except for Polish respondents to the question of intra-EU migration – 19 per cent, against an EU average of 29 per cent). As far as migration from outside EU countries is concerned, Polish respondents again seem to be the least negative of the V4 countries (62 per cent), but still more negative than the EU average (52 per cent).

During the migration crisis of 2015, different aspects (general and more specific) of fear connected to asylum seekers and migrants were also examined by a specific Central European survey,<sup>5</sup> as this issue had special relevance in light of the recent terror attacks in Europe and worldwide.<sup>6</sup> Welfare chauvinism<sup>7</sup> refers to the concept by which welfare benefits should be restricted to certain groups – particularly to the natives of a country, rather

<sup>5</sup> CEORG: Central European Opinion Research Group, see more at: <http://old.tarki.hu/en/services/ceorg/>


<sup>6</sup> It has to be emphasized, however, that in all the countries, the fieldwork for the CEORG research was carried out before the Paris terror attack of 13 November 2015. The fieldwork was carried out in August 2015 in Poland, September 2015 in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, and October 2015 in Hungary.

<sup>7</sup> In recent empirical research, not only the economic aspect of welfare chauvinism has been assessed but also the social and cultural aspects. See, for example, the development of the DEREX index on right-wing extremism (information on this can be found at <http://derexindex.eu/>). In this broader context, therefore, altogether three items assessed the attitudes to welfare chauvinism in our questionnaire.

than immigrants.<sup>8</sup> The idea of ‘welfare services should be restricted to our own’ has a great impact on public opinion and on asylum policy.

Figure 4 shows the different levels of fear in the four countries examined. Apparently, the level of fear was very high in all the countries (and had little connection with the number of asylum seekers actually present in each country at the time of the fieldwork). The only exception, to some extent, is Poland, where the level of fear, especially in response to the statement ‘interacting with immigrants makes me uneasy’, was considerably lower.

Figure 4 *The different levels of fear in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary; the proportion of those who ‘totally’ or ‘rather’ agreed that... (N = c. 1,000) (per cent, 2015)*




Levels of fear were significantly higher in Slovakia and the Czech Republic than in Hungary, except for on the item related to the control of immigration. In Hungary – where the presence of asylum seekers and refugees was significant throughout that summer – every second respondent agreed that ‘immigration in our country is out of control’, whereas the figure was 44 per cent in the Czech Republic, 33 per cent in Poland and 24 per cent in Slovakia.

The proportion of those agreeing with the two more-specific fears – one connected with the increase in crime and the other having to do with the spread of diseases – varied to a large extent by country. The statement connected with the threat of disloyalty in case of war or political tension was supported by roughly two thirds of respondents, except in Poland.

<sup>8</sup> The term was first used by Jørgen Goul Andersen and Tor Bjørklund in Denmark and Norway in the 1990s.

The level of welfare chauvinism was assessed from an economic, cultural and social perspective. (See the specific items and the rankings by country in *Figure 5*.)

*Figure 5 The level of the different aspects of welfare chauvinism in the Visegrád countries: the proportion of those who 'totally' or 'rather' agreed that ... (per cent, 2015)*



The level of fear connected to welfare chauvinism was highest in the Czech Republic and lowest in Poland. The data from Slovakia and Hungary show almost the same results. The ranking of the different aspects was the same in all countries, except for Poland: the threat connected to the way of life (social aspect) was perceived to be the largest threat in all countries; meanwhile the labour shortage threat (economic aspect) was the lowest in three countries – Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic.


### **3. Hungarian attitudes during the crisis: what people think about the different reasons for fleeing**

With regard to the migration crisis, one of the key questions is where all these people are coming from and why. The Hungarian public discourse has shown some interest in knowing why refugees have left their country of origin and whether they have done so on well-founded grounds, such as fear of persecution on account of their race, religion, nationality, social group or political

opinions. Presumably people are more tolerant of asylum seekers who are escaping from war zones, as it is easy to regard them as people in extreme distress.

Figure 6 shows attitudes and changes in attitude toward the different reasons asylum seekers have for fleeing, in order of how welcome a given group is. Respondents drew a clear distinction both in October 2015 and January 2016 between (1) those who had left their country due to war or civil war, or had fled due to hunger or natural catastrophe, or with the aim of family reunion, and (2) those claiming asylum for some other reason (such as being part of an oppressed ethnic, national or religious minority). The level of acceptance of that second group is lower. In the case of those who have left their home country due to lack of work, the level of acceptance is very low: the great majority of the Hungarian adult population does not welcome them at all, in line with the current asylum policy of both the Hungarian government and the European Union (Figure 6).

Figure 6 *Acceptance of the different reasons for fleeing, in order of welcome (percentage of respondents who answered ‘yes’ to the question ‘Of the asylum seekers, should Hungary admit those...?’), 2015 and 2016*



Furthermore, it is clear that attitudes of welcome dropped dramatically between October 2015 and January 2016 – in most cases by half, regardless of

whether the reason for fleeing was war or religion. While in October more than half (52 per cent) of the population would accept asylum seekers who left their country due to war or civil war, in January only one third (34 per cent) of the population had a welcoming attitude toward them. The numbers are similar in the case of hunger and natural catastrophe (where the level of acceptance dropped from 50 to 35 per cent), and family reunion (from 48 to 38 per cent). Moreover, the level of acceptance in the case of persecution on the grounds of ethnic or national origin dropped by half, from 33 to 17 per cent, as it did in the case of persecution on account of political activity (from 27 to 13 per cent). The level of acceptance in the case of lack of work was almost non-existent in January 2016 (only 5 per cent), though in October 2015 it had been 10 per cent.

In the first wave (October 2015), there was a separate item for Islamic State (ISIS) as a reason for leaving; in that case, 35 per cent of the population was welcoming. In the second wave (January 2016), religious affiliation was divided into two separate questions (Christians and Muslims), in order to see whether there was a difference in the responses. While roughly a quarter (23 per cent) of respondents would welcome asylum seekers who were being persecuted for belonging to a Christian sect, only 9 per cent responded positively in the case of Muslims.

### *3.1 The social predictors of refusing asylum seekers for multiple reasons*

With two so-called ‘level of refusal’ indices (based on the October 2015 and January 2016 surveys) we measured the average number of the rejected *reasons for fleeing* using selected socio-demographic indicators. The indices contain all the items except for *lack of work*, as that is not a legitimate basis for an asylum claim. With the two indices following the same scale (0–7), comparison could be made between the attitudes surveyed in October and in January; however, the items included in the indices were not identical. Based on a comparison of the average in the analysis presented in the Annex (*Table A1* and *Table A2*), we have created a profile for those people who are more welcoming toward asylum seekers with different reasons for fleeing, as well as for those who are less welcoming.

The following socio-demographic indicators were tested on both waves to see whether or not they have an effect on attitudes toward asylum seekers, refugees and migrants: level of education, age, gender, personal contact with asylum seekers/refugees/migrants, whether one met them or not, region, type of settlement, party preference, and political activity.

In October 2015, level of education played a significant role in attitude: people with higher educational levels (at least a college degree) were more welcoming (an average of 3.6 out of 7) than people with elementary, vocational or high-school degrees (total average: 4.2). But this difference had disappeared by January, which means that level of education lost its effect on attitudes toward asylum seekers, refugees and migrants.

Region of residence as a socio-demographic indicator was significant in both waves, as was type of settlement. In October 2015, people who lived in Western Transdanubia were the most welcoming (on average, they rejected only 3.6 reasons for people fleeing), while people in Northern Hungary were the least welcoming, with an average of 4.9 reasons rejected. In January 2016, the picture was different: the most welcoming group was in the Northern Great Plain (4.5 – almost 1 point higher than in October), and the least welcoming were in Central Transdanubia (5.9, compared to 4.9 in October). People from small towns were more welcoming in October (3.8 points of refusal on average), whereas in January that average had increased slightly to 4.2.

What should be highlighted here is the reverse effect of the two types of interaction with migrants measured by the survey: (i) *superficial contact*, i.e. having met some kind of incomers and (ii) *personal contact*. In October, those who had had some kind of superficial contact with incomers (asylum seekers, refugees or migrants) in the previous 12 months rejected a significantly higher number of reasons for migration than people who had not (an average of 4.7 reasons rejected in the case of those who had met an asylum seeker, refugee or migrant, compared to 4.1 in the case of those who had not). In January, both groups of people rejected a significantly higher number of reasons, but the trend remained the same: those who had met asylum seekers, refugees or migrants rejected more reasons (5.65 vs. 5.27).

On the second question on interaction, we assessed personal contact of some kind with incomers (i.e. asylum seekers, refugees and migrants). Those who personally knew migrants rejected on average only 1.7 reasons, while those who did not know any rejected 4.3 reasons on average. However, in January only a small difference was measured between these two groups of respondents (4.5 vs. 5.4). It has to be mentioned, however, that the proportion of those who personally knew migrants was very low (3 per cent of the sample in October 2015 and 4 per cent in January 2016), while the proportion of those who had met some kind of migrants in the past 12 months was surprisingly high (24 per cent in October and 27 per cent in January), suggesting that people interpreted this question broadly. (See *Table A1* in Annex).

Political activity and party preference were analysed in both October and January. Political activity did not have a significant effect on attitudes either in the first or in the second wave. On the other hand, party preference did have an effect, and the effect increased in January for every group. Both in October and January, MSZP voters were the most welcoming, while Jobbik voters and Fidesz voters<sup>9</sup> had very similar averages for the number of reasons for flight that they rejected (significantly more than MSZP voters). For further details on the analysis of the social aspects of the 2015 migration crisis in Hungary, see Simonovits et al. (2016).

#### **4. Conclusion**

The issues of migration and terrorism have both been of increasing concern since 2014, though there has been a slight decline in mentions from 2016/17. According to the latest results of the Eurobarometer survey (Spring 2018), at the EU level immigration is seen as the most important issue facing the EU; Estonian, Czech and Hungarian respondents were those most concerned about this issue.

For the EU Member States in 2018, the two topics of unemployment and health and social security are the issues currently of greatest concern, with immigration coming third.

Analysing European public opinion, strong country-level differences can be seen; however, at the EU level attitudes toward migration scarcely changed (if at all) during the two years examined (between 2014 and 2016) in terms of selected aspects of immigration into the EU. Hungary differs dramatically from all the other countries examined: over those two years the proportion of those who opposed immigration and who had a negative attitude toward the impact of immigration doubled or even tripled. Beyond Hungary, the biggest increases in antipathy toward migration were to be found in the Czech Republic and Lithuania. Analysing public attitudes in the Visegrád countries, respondents were found to be much more negative about third-country immigrants than about intra-EU migrants.

In the 2015 CEORG survey, a set of items was developed to measure the different elements of fear, as well as the perceived threat posed by immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees to the country's welfare system. Levels of fear were significantly higher in Slovakia and the Czech Republic than in Hungary

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<sup>9</sup> MSZP is the Hungarian Socialist Party, Fidesz is a right-wing party in government, while Jobbik is the extreme right-wing party in Hungary.

(except on one item related to the control of immigration), while the public's views in Poland were the least dismissive of all migration-related questions.

Focusing on the Hungarian data, we explored how Hungarian public attitudes were formed towards various *reasons for fleeing* during the 2015 migration crisis. As far as the socio-demographic predictors are concerned, we found similar relationships as in other xenophobic attitudes (see Simonovits and Szalai, 2013): of all the socio-demographic predictors examined, place of residence (both type of *settlement* and *region*) and party preference play a significant role in welcoming attitudes (level of education had an effect only in the first wave, but neither gender nor age had a statistically significant effect at all). What should be highlighted here is the reverse effect of the two types of interaction with migrants measured by the survey: respondents who had had only *superficial contact* with immigrants were found to be more dismissive of asylum seekers, while those who had had real *personal contact* with immigrants showed more tolerance of refugees. This tendency is in line with the core ideas contained within the framework of Integrated Contact Hypothesis, originally developed by Allport (1954) and further refined by Pettigrew and Tropp (2000; 2006). For more details on the socio-demographic background of xenophobia, see Dencső and Sik (2007) and Simonovits and Szalai (2013). A more complex analysis of perceived threats and fears can be found in Simonovits (2016).

## ANNEX: COMPLEMENTARY DATA

Table A1 *The number of rejected reasons for fleeing, by selected socio-demographic indicators (average), October 2015*

	average	N	st deviation
Level of education			
Elementary school at most	4.36	140	2.63
Vocational school	4.53	220	2.47
High school	4.17	266	2.69
College degree	3.64	107	2.59
Total	4.24	733	2.61
Sign (F probe)		0.032	
Type of settlement			
County seat	5.17	117	2.07
City	4.26	253	2.64
Town	3.81	217	2.69
Budapest	4.10	146	2.63
Total	4.24	733	2.61
Sign (F probe)		0.000	
Personal contact			
Personally know asylum seeker, refugee or migrant	1.67	24	2.20
Do not personally know asylum seeker, refugee or migrant	4.32	709	2.58
Total	4.24	733	2.61
Sign (F probe)		0.000	
Superficial contact			
Have met an asylum seeker, refugee or migrant in Hungary in the past 12 months	4.74	200	2.65
Have not met any	4.05	532	2.57
Total	4.24	732	2.61
Sign (F probe)		0.001	
Region			
Central Hungary	4.14	244	2.68
Central Transdanubia	4.54	65	2.78
Western Transdanubia	3.62	76	2.71
Southern Transdanubia	4.62	63	2.17
Northern Hungary	4.93	86	2.28
Northern Great Plain	3.81	104	2.58
Southern Great Plain	4.36	95	2.66
Total	4.24	733	2.61
		0.014	
Party preference			
Fidesz voters	4.88	225	2.40
MSZP voters	3.28	58	2.71
Jobbik voters	4.66	104	2.43
Total	4.27	441	2.61

\* only those indicators are presented whose effect was significant at a 0.05 level.

Table A2 *The number of rejected reasons for fleeing, by selected socio-demographic indicators (average), January 2016*

	average	N	st deviation
Personal contact			
Personally know asylum seeker, refugee or migrant	4.53	30	2.37
Do not personally know asylum seeker, refugee or migrant	5.40	750	1.9
Total	5.37	780	1.93
Sign (F probe)		0.016	
Superficial contact			
Have met an asylum seeker, refugee or migrant in Hungary in the past 12 months	5.65	213	1.99
Have not met any	5.27	567	1.90
Total	5.37	780	1.93
Sign (F probe)		0.014	
Region			
Central Hungary	5.45	237	1.99
Central Transdanubia	5.87	86	1.64
Western Transdanubia	5.69	62	2.01
Southern Transdanubia	5.22	77	1.68
Northern Hungary	5.32	104	1.68
Northern Great Plain	4.49	102	2.11
Southern Great Plain	5.59	114	1.95
Total	5.37	782	1.93
Sign (F probe)		0.000	
Type of settlement			
County seat	5.77	114	1.66
City	5.32	269	1.91
Town	5.18	248	1.97
Budapest	5.47	151	2.06
Total	5.37	782	1.93
Sign (F probe)		0.047	
Party preference			
Fidesz voters	5.74	261	1.73
MSZP voters	4.67	60	1.97
Jobbik voters	5.70	101	1.64
Total	5.58	422	1.78
Sign (F probe)		0.000	

\* only those indicators are presented whose effect was significant at a 0.05 level.

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