The case of Hungary – de Wilde goes wild

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to shed some light on the characteristics of politicization of the public debate in Hungary surrounding the EU quota of refugees. We showcase the results of an empirical study that we have conducted using various methods. We look at two episodes of contention (the ‘quota debate’ of 2015 and the ‘quota referendum’ of 2016) in two major public fora: the media and parliament, and analyse data on public opinion during these years.

Since early 2015, the issues of migration in general, and the relocation quota in particular, have been captured and used by the government to win popularity and to frame the political discourse in the public sphere. To achieve this, a unique mass-manipulation technique has been developed – the so-called ‘moral panic button’. This is a long-term, high-cost manipulation technique which monopolizes all forms of media and reduces the room for manoeuvre of non-governmental actors.

As to the concrete characteristics of the quota debate in these trends, (1) politicians are the main actors in the media; the main frames used are embedded in and serve the political interests of the government. (2) With some exceptions, the quota debate gets detached from other, concrete issues and experiences in Hungary, and is discussed in the context of the government’s interests in local and European politics. (3) As for parliament, none of the parties find the quota an adequate answer to the refugee crisis. The overall attitude of parliament is not pro-refugee: even the leftist and more liberal parties employ a careful rhetoric, emphasizing immediate help for those in need, but avoiding the oft-quoted accusation of being ‘migrant-lovers’.

We can conclude that even though the issue of migration – and the relocation quota in particular – has reached a high level of salience in Hungary, because of the uniquely strong role of the government, the theoretically crucial element of the politicization process – i.e. the ‘competitive representative claims-making in the public sphere’ (de Wilde, 2011: 572) – is missing.

Keywords: moral panic button, politicization, relocation quota, xenophobia, Hungary

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Introduction

According to de Wilde (2011), the settings where politicization takes place are parliament, the public sphere and public opinion. Throughout this chapter we focus on the processes of potential politicization in these settings in Hungary, where these institutions are strongly dominated by the government. We find a significant increase in salience, which occurred without polarization of opinions or expansion of the actors. Arguably, this incongruity occurs because de Wilde’s concept contains the implicit assumption that the setting for politicization is a liberal democracy with independent actors in the political and public sphere. Since contemporary Hungary is closer to an autocracy than a democracy (Kornai, 2016), these conditions do not apply. Therefore, we argue that politicization, as defined by de Wilde (de Wilde, 2011), is only nominally present in the Hungarian context. Caution must be exercised when comparing the intense, yet distorted process of politicization found in Hungary with that found in other countries. We have to consider that state dominance in politics and the media may create conditions in which there is growing salience, but at the same time limited polarization and a decreasing number of visible actors. In our case study, we demonstrate that politicization processes in Hungary have been controlled by the government, arguably as part of the so-called ‘moral panic button’ toolkit (Sik, 2016; Barlai and Sik, 2017). The moral panic button includes several forms of manipulation via a wide range of channels, but also such techniques as ‘national consultations’, the ‘quota referendum’ and the use of the ‘migrant card’ to frame parliamentary elections.

The public sphere in Hungary

Hungary joined the European Union in 2004 with significant public support. Since 2010, a right-wing/nationalist coalition of Fidesz and the KDNP (a tiny Christian Democratic party) has been in power, and since April 2018 it has had a two-thirds majority in parliament. The Hungarian government, led by Viktor Orbán, has been restructuring the country’s democratic institutions (including the media, the electoral system, the Constitutional Court, the system of ombudspersons), in order to turn Hungary into what Prime Minister Viktor Orbán calls an ‘illiberal democracy’. Increasing government control over more and more segments of society has been complemented by strong government narratives to reinterpret Hungary’s past and present, and to reset Hungary’s geopolitical relationships. The most significant feature is the strong anti-EU rhetoric. The parliamentary opposition consists of a radical right-wing party (Jobbik), the socialist party (MSzP) and fragmented liberal/green/leftist parties.

As part of a reduction in the democratic checks and balances, the Hungarian parliament has been shorn of some of its important functions: it has become more difficult for MPs to form investigative

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1 The concept of moral panic first appeared in 1972 in Folk Devils and Moral Panics, by the sociologist Stanley Cohen, who defined it as ‘A condition, episode, person, or groups of persons that emerged to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests’. 
committees; both the length and the number of interventions made by MPs have declined, despite a surge in the number of decisions made by parliament; most debate takes place in non-public committees, rather than in open sessions of parliament; and important laws have been rushed through the legislative process without substantial public debate (the constitution, media laws, etc.). Instead of persuasion through debate and exchange of ideas, the Fidesz government relies on its parliamentary majority (Szabó, 2017). To sum up, parliament does not serve as a significant forum for political deliberation or debate.

Over the past eight years, the government has substantially restructured the media as well (Mérték Füzetek, 2017). The government exercises control over the media through a wide range of means:

- Regulation: a set of media laws was passed between 2010 and 2012. These have been heavily criticized both internally and externally for their potential to curb press freedom.
- The public service media have been turned into a government mouthpiece.
- Buy-outs and takeovers have changed the Hungarian media-ownership landscape, resulting in a situation whereby the mainstream media are (except for a few outlets) in the hands of government allies (Mertek, 2017).
- The strategic placing of state advertising means that the pro-government media are flourishing, while media that are critical of the government struggle to survive (Mertek, 2017).
- The Hungarian government has run national billboard, TV and radio campaigns on various topics using public resources.²

By these means, the Hungarian government has unique influence on public discourse: on agenda setting, content of the discourse, information flow and language. The government played a particularly important role in the framing of the coverage of migration in the Hungarian media (Messing and Bernath, 2016).

A notable exception to this – one that does provide a plurality of voices and narratives – is the online space, where freedom of expression is fully practised. However, the significant polarization of content and of audiences (the so called ‘echo chambers’) present in online media limits their potential to provide a space for public debate and to inform the public.

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² The most recent pressing of the moral panic button is an anti-EU ‘campaign’ in which the government ‘informs’ the Hungarian people that approval of the Sargentini report is a punishment for the Hungarian nation for building the fence against illegal immigration and fighting Merkel and Soros (http://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-foreign-affairs-and-trade/news/the-sargentini-report-is-revenge-against-hungary).
Public opinion and xenophobia

Xenophobia has increased in Hungary since the early 2010s, and a rapidly growing new trend emerged in 2015 (Figure 1, blue line). At the same time, the proportion of ‘thinkers’ (pink line) has fallen below the level of the xenophobes; and the (always small) xenophile population has all but disappeared.

**Figure 1** The level of xenophobia in Hungary (%), 1992–2017


The level of intolerance in Hungary has always been comparatively high in international terms (Figure 2). And whereas in some countries (Czech Republic and Austria) its level has risen somewhat since 2015, in Hungary there has been a rapid and steadily increasing trend.

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3 Xenophobes are those who would not allow asylum seekers to enter Hungary at all. The xenophiles would allow all asylum seekers to enter. The ‘thinker’ rejects both extremes and requests more information.
In September 2015, immediately after the first wave of the ‘refugee crisis’, Hungary was one of the countries where the population considered immigration to be the greatest problem facing the EU (it was in fourth place, behind Malta, Italy and the Czech Republic, and with a similar value to that of Estonia) (Sik and Szeitl, 2016) (see Map 1).

The share of those who would flatly reject all migrants without consideration any migrants coming from poorer countries outside Europe (Messing and Ságvári, 2018: 9).
Several comparative analyses have shown (Juhász and Molnár, 2016; Messing and Ságvári, 2018) that Hungary has always been among the EU countries with a higher-than-average level of xenophobia, even before the steep rise after 2015. According to the most recent comparative survey (Connor, 2018), the majority of the Hungarian population (in company only with non-EU countries such as Russia, Israel and South Africa) would not let asylum seekers enter the country.

As for the socio-economic basis of xenophobia (Sik, 2015), the fact of being a potential voter for a nationalist/right-wing party (i.e. the governing Fidesz party or especially Jobbik, the strongest opposition party) significantly increases the probability of xenophobia. Living in a major city (other than Budapest), having a university diploma and being religious all inhibit xenophobia, while fear increases the likelihood of xenophobia.6

5 The question (Q29) read thus: ‘In your opinion, what are the main challenges facing the EU and its Member States in the future? Firstly? And secondly? And thirdly? ... Immigration.’
6 Simonovits (2016) confirms these findings, and on the basis of her results we would add that xenophobia is higher if there is no personal contact between the public and the migrants.
Salience

In order to put down a benchmark for analysing the salience of migration and the relocation quota in the Hungarian media, it should be stated that up to and including 2014, migrants and migration did not constitute a major theme in the Hungarian media (Minorities..., 2011; Zádori, 2014).

The number of articles mentioning the relocation quota during May–November 2015 shows (Figure 3) that the topic became relevant only in early September, i.e. the communication of EU-level relocation quota decisions did not capture the attention of the Hungarian media. This may be due to a combination of factors: the behaviour of the news-oriented commercial media (for which a mere EU decision is not interesting enough) and the downplaying by the government-dominated public media of any direct information on EU actions – i.e. information not (yet) fitted into the government’s communication frame.

**Figure 3** Number of relocation quota-related articles per week between May and November 2015

Notes: N (total) = 356, average (red line) – 11.7.

EU dates (blue arrows): 13 May 2015 – European Agenda on Migration (the possibility of a relocation quota is referenced); 26 June 2015 – European Council (plan of relocation for 40,000 asylum seekers from Greece and Italy); 22 September 2015 – European Council agreement (120,000 asylum seekers from Greece and Italy).

HU dates (green arrows): 22 September 2015 – Refugees clash with police at the border (Röszke); 4 November 2015 – Fidesz starts collecting signatures against quota.

For a more detailed compilation of the events in 2015, see Annex. An even more detailed list from the core period of 2015 is to be found in (MIGSZOL, 2016).

Source: Own elaboration.

Had the refugee crisis-related ‘news tsunami’ of August and September been a standard moral panic, it would have been over by mid-October, since by that time the refugees had moved beyond Hungary. However, because the Hungarian government kept the issue on the agenda by initiating a referendum on the quota, and then started to collect signatures against the relocation quota as part of the preparation for the anti-quota referendum in October 2016, the average weekly number of relocation
quota articles again reached twice the average from early November. As Figure 4 demonstrates, the government’s repeated pressing of the moral panic button kept the ‘refugee crisis’ on the agenda at least until mid-2016.

**Figure 4** Weekly frequency of migration-related articles between 1 October 2014 and 8 June 2016

Notes: x-axis indicates the first day of the week.

Keywords: migrant, immigrant, refugee.

Key elements of the story:

(1) 7 June 2015: Fence along the Serbian border announced.

(2) 27 August 2015: Dead migrants found in a truck; 29 August 2015: Preliminary fence at the Serbian border ready; 4 September 2015: Migrants start to walk to Vienna; 16 September 2015: Refugees clash with police at Röszke.

(3) 7 June 2016: Parliament votes on terror; 13 June 2016: Parliament votes on new refugee law.

Source: Precognox dashboard, N (total) = 42,777; number of weeks = 88; weekly average (red line) = 486.

On the basis of new evidence, we assume that the moral panic button remained a major component of the Hungarian government’s operations even after the 2018 parliamentary elections.
Qualitative analysis of the quota debate

In this section, we discuss the main characteristics of the coverage of the quota debate in the Hungarian online media and parliament. First, we show the results of a qualitative, in-depth analysis of online media content and parliamentary debates between 1 May and 31 November 2015 (the period of the debate surrounding the introduction of the relocation quota) and then for the period from 1 June to 31 December 2016 (the period of the ‘quota referendum’ in Hungary).

The relocation quota in the online media in 2015

Frames

We have identified various ‘frames’ in the coverage of the quota debate: the ‘power struggle’ frame; the ‘humanitarian/solidarity’ frame; the ‘economy’ frame; the ‘organizational/technical’ frame; and the ‘threat: terrorism/security’ frame. The most prominent frame is by far the power struggle. In this frame, the quota debate is situated in the context of European politics on the one hand, and the question of sovereignty on the other. This frame was pushed hard by the Hungarian government and was reinforced by the media in various forms: even media outlets critical of the Hungarian government interpreted events in the context of the interests of various governments/statespersons/the EU and how successful they were at manipulating/convincing/strong-arming others to push their agenda. Some of the articles using the ‘power struggle’ frame construct the events as a straightforward bargaining process; others play the blame game and indulge in finger pointing. The most notable interpretation of the quota debate is that of national sovereignty, the Hungarian government’s most prominent argument. According to this interpretation, the quota debate is about ‘Europe’s aspirations to place national states under the bureaucracy of the European Union, in a quasi-province status’ – or specifically, about the right of nation states to protect their borders. In Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s words: ‘Instead of the quota, we have to let individual Member States decide … We should give Member States back the right to protect their borders.’ These arguments placed the Hungarian government in the role of a freedom fighter protecting Hungary from the dangers posed by the powerful European elites.

Another frame present in the articles was the ‘humanitarian/solidarity’ frame. This was usually in conjunction with criticism of – and frequently came in direct response to – the Hungarian government’s narrative and actions. It involved arguments in favour of solidarity with refugees and references to human rights; and it evoked the plight of refugees and migrants. According to articles in this frame, the quota was either the most humane realistic solution on the table, or else it paid scant regard to refugees and their rights. The ‘economy’ frame focused on the economic costs and benefits related to the quota system – and migration in general. It was used in pro-quota, anti-quota and neutral articles.

7 We have conducted an in-depth analysis of online media content for the periods 1 May to 30 November 2015 (the period of the debate surrounding the introduction of the relocation quota) and 1 June 2016 to 31 December 2016 (the period of the ‘quota referendum’ in Hungary). We included articles from the following media outlets in the analysis: nol.hu, atv.hu, mandiner.hu, 444.hu, origo.hu, mno.hu, 24.hu, index.hu, hvg.hu, alfahir.hu, nepszava.hu, vs.hu, pestisracok.hu, rtlklub.hu, tv2.hu, hirado.hu. A total of 334 articles were included and read in the first period, and 147 in the second period; of these, 29 and 27, respectively, were selected for in-depth examination.


9 https://index.hu/kulfold/2015/05/19/orban_viktor_az_ep-ulesen_vedi_a_kormanyt/orban_kvota_helyett_sajat_dontest/
alike. According to this frame, the quota debate was – or should have been – about how much the mandatory quota system would cost; how much rejection of the quota system would cost; and the economic advantages/disadvantages of migration, usually putting numbers to the different options and proposals. The ‘organizational/technical’ frame focused on the details of logistics, registration, traffic, etc. related to the proposed quota system, usually emphasizing the disruptions and difficulties that the quota would bring. Finally, we identified the ‘threat: terrorism/security’ frame: this was present throughout the period under examination (January 2015 – April 2018), but it invariably surged in the aftermath of terrorist acts in Europe. According to this frame, the mandatory quota system contributed to a situation that made Europe an insecure place, bringing threats to Europeans’ health and physical safety. In some of the articles, the mandatory quota was the threat itself that we had to avoid at all costs.


The articles demonstrate a strategic use of statistics, with the government talking about ‘hundreds of thousands’ (or even ‘millions’) and ‘flows’ when discussing migration, and the opposition and NGOs and experts trying to refute these claims – either not discussing numbers at all or downplaying them.

Another linguistic characteristic was the frequent dehumanizing rhetoric present in the media when speaking of migrants (and at times of European politicians and the opposition) in a loaded, at times cynical way. For example, this from an MP for the far-right party, Jobbik:

Jobbik does not support the return or re-delivery of even one migrant to Hungary according to the quota. Even one immigrant coming back this way is one more than acceptable … Jobbik wants to protect the Hungarian nation from the negative consequences of the invasion-like flow.10

When speaking of the power struggle and the ‘freedom fight’ led by the Hungarian government against the European elite, the language used by the media (quoting politicians) is often passionate, employing tropes of war and combat. On the other hand, there was an emotional detachment when discussing the details of the quota as policy, and the style often turned technical.

There are a number of historical metaphors employed in the articles as well. The government and Jobbik politicians would refer to episodes in Hungarian history when Hungary was ‘invaded’ or forced by bigger powers to act against its own interests; to the forced ethnic population transfer/resettlement after the Second World War; and to the ancient mass migration to the Carpathian basin during the period from the fourth to the sixth century. The 1956 revolution and its aftermath were referenced both by the Hungarian government (emphasizing that the Hungarian political refugees of 1956 respected the rules of receiving countries and stayed in refugee camps as long as they had to) and by Western European politicians (as how the European countries accepted Hungarian refugees). On

10 http://alfahir.hu/meghatral_a_kormany_kvota_ugyben
several occasions, when condemning the fence built by the Hungarian government on the country’s southern border, Western European leaders and Hungarian liberal and leftist politicians described the Berlin Wall as bad practice that should not be repeated. Communist times in general were often mentioned. Austrian Chancellor Werner Faymann even referred to the ‘darkest time of our continent’,\(^{11}\) when speaking of the way in which refugees were treated by the Hungarian government (a comment that sparked a passionate response from Viktor Orbán).

**Actors**

As discussed earlier, politicians dominated the media coverage of the quota debate. The most visible actors were members of the Hungarian government and the governing party, Fidesz, with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in the leading role. The Hungarian opposition was barely in evidence, with the exception of the far-right Jobbik. There were very few occasions when experts and NGOs were visible. Migrants/refugees/asylum seekers were not given a voice in the coverage of the quota debate: only their images were used – otherwise they were excluded from the discussion and the decision-making process. These images contributed to the (re-)construction of the narrative of ‘us’ (active, those in a position of power, able to include or exclude, accept or reject the ‘other’) and ‘them’ (either vulnerable, different, weak, deprived of agency and control, passive, tragic and infantilized, or else dangerous and threatening). These images created a hierarchical relationship between the viewer and the object, and therefore implicitly justified refugees’ exclusion from the discourse, as well as their treatment as objects of ‘our’ decisions.

The actors appear as simplified binary constructs in the media, depending on the topics and frames present:

a) In the power struggle frame, the actors are winners or losers; strong or weak.

   We give the impression that strong leaders are dangerous, that a weak leader is a good leader ... but in a crisis we need leaders who are ready to leave the beaten path if necessary ... said Viktor Orbán.\(^ {12}\)

b) In the sovereignty frame, they are protectors of our/the national/the people’s interest vs. threats/attacks/actors working for the interests of foreign powers. Actors depicted (mostly by government politicians) as being ‘against’ the interests of the people are European politicians, opposition parties or NGOs, academics and experts.

c) When the effectiveness frame is central, we find the dichotomy of realist/pragmatic/efficient/active/responsible/courageous vs. delusional/naïve/soft/out of touch with reality/passive/irresponsible/weak. Actors in the former category are usually the Hungarian government, and sometimes the Visegrád Four countries. Actors appearing in the latter category are usually the representatives of European institutions, NGOs or intergovernmental organizations, Western European politicians who are delusional, naïve, passive, irresponsible and out of touch with reality.

   According to Viktor Orbán, ‘the EU is floating, weak, insecure and paralysed’.

   ‘Meetings and conferences aplenty, but no solutions’ – he said. ‘We are entangled in


\(^{12}\) [http://mno.hu/belfold/orban-ha-torveny-lesz-a-kvetarendszerbol-el-kell-fogadnunk-1304677](http://mno.hu/belfold/orban-ha-torveny-lesz-a-kvetarendszerbol-el-kell-fogadnunk-1304677)
a web of ideologies instead of acting according to common sense, our own culture and tradition.\textsuperscript{13}

d) Democracy is also a theme that actors use to construct themselves and their opposition: actors are either democratic or oppressive/steamroller the opposition/anti-democratic/play political games. Sometimes in conjunction with the power-struggle frame, we observe competition among actors for the ‘democrat’ label. However, actors’ interpretation of ‘democratic’ can be very different. In the arguments of the Hungarian government, for example, ‘democratic’ means acting in the interests of an (imagined) majority, whereas members of civil society, Western politicians and EU representatives often refer to rule of law or respect for human rights as democratic principles.

e) In the humanitarian frame, we see actors constructed as humane/compassionate vs. vicious/inhumane. Those opposing the quota, especially Viktor Orbán himself, are against humanitarian values in general, while supporters of the quota (Juncker or Merkel, usually) defend them. According to the Hungarian government, the West is responsible for the conflicts at the heart of mass migration, and thus it lacks the moral and ethical right to pose as defenders of humanitarian values. Also, according to these interpretations, the quota (and its supporters) is immoral, as it promises migrants something that the EU cannot deliver, i.e. it spreads false hope (‘It is our Christian obligation not to raise false hopes’ – Viktor Orbán).\textsuperscript{14} In its arguments, in order to deflect accusations of the inhumane treatment of human beings, the Hungarian government distinguishes between deserving, ‘real’ refugees and ‘economic’ migrants or ‘immigrants’.

These constructed binaries contribute to the image of the quota as a significant part of a moral system and far beyond mere policy. This approach defines the actors and divides entire populations into camps of good/bad, strong/weak, realist/naïve. Such a construct, of course, provides a hotbed for moral panic – and is consequently a necessary (though insufficient) element of the moral panic button.

**Arguments**

As the Hungarian government is the most dominant actor in the media when it comes to the quota debate, it is not surprising that overall the anti-quota arguments have been prominent in the Hungarian media. Below, we briefly discuss the main anti-quota arguments observed:

a) The most common anti-quota argument is that the mandatory quota proposal is unrealistic. This is because (i) it disregards the behaviour of migrants and (ii) it cannot be enforced since, for example, we do not know how many migrants we would have to redistribute, etc. These (supposedly factual) statements are rarely backed up with hard evidence; instead, it is usually claimed that they are ‘common sense’.

b) The mandatory quota system runs counter to the will of the people and damages the sovereignty of nation states. According to this argument, put forward by the Hungarian and other Visegrád Four governments, regardless of whether the quota is an effective solution to the problem, it is wrong if it is mandatory and is not decided at the national level. Also, in these arguments again we observe references to the interests of the people (the majority) that these governments claim to embody and represent.

c) The quota system serves as an invitation to migrants. It encourages migrants to come to Europe, and is therefore irresponsible, since it creates false hopes and expectations that

\textsuperscript{13} http://pestisracok.hu/orban-szerint-a-kotelezo-kvota-csak-szetteritene-a-terrorizmust

\textsuperscript{14} http://mno.hu/eu/orban-a-kvotarendszer-illuzio-1302946
Europe cannot meet. Hence, the quota is morally wrong and opposing it is the morally right option.

d) The quota creates health risks: infections and illnesses, and in general carries the threat of epidemics. Consequently, supporting the quota means being irresponsible and ignoring basic facts of nature.

e) The quota increases the probability of terrorism and crime in Europe. This argument has been prominent in the media since January 2015, when the Hungarian prime minister announced that ‘European people are under attack’ following the terrorist attack on Charlie Hebdo. In addition to terrorism, according to these arguments, the quota brings crime to Europe, as is made clear by the crime statistics for European cities with high levels of immigration (often referring to the prevalence of no-go zones in Western Europe).

f) The quota endangers European culture/Christianity, our ‘way of life’. This argument envisions a huge, uncontrolled influx of Muslim migrants to Europe that will change the basic values and traditions forever, until we ‘cease to recognize ourselves’.

g) Finally, the quota is problematic from a legal point of view: the situation is ‘absurd’ – what legal grounds or other tools has the EU to enforce the quota decision? And what about the rights of migrants? The first question often features in articles that are otherwise not explicitly against the quota. Interestingly, the second legal question – regarding the right of migrants to free movement – is often brought up by right-wing politicians in the Hungarian media (as an argument against the quota).

Even media outlets that are highly critical of the government’s stance and politics on migration seem to focus on criticizing the anti-quota arguments, without advancing any pro-quota arguments. This may be a consequence of the highly politicized nature of the topic and the scarcity of actors representing pro-quota arguments. There are a few exceptions we found for pro-quota arguments, mainly from EU representatives, European statespersons, some Hungarian NGOs, experts and opposition politicians:

a) Humanity and common sense: according to the first pro-quota argument, it is a moral obligation to show solidarity and responsibility toward vulnerable human beings, and the quota system is a logical and straightforward solution to the problem. This argument has been presented most prominently by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker in the Hungarian media.

b) A common solution to a common problem: according to this argument, the most important element is the shared nature of the ‘burden’ – and therefore of the solution to the problem. It evokes a sense of solidarity (not with the refugees, but with the family of European states struggling to cope with the crisis): ‘We are in this together’; ‘we must find a solution together’. It reinforces the idea that there is a (major) problem that needs to be solved, and presents the quota proposal as a common solution.

c) A similar (but more pragmatic) argument is that policies like the quota are the price for being part of the EU: we have to share the pain, not just the gain. While this argument complements the previous one, it does not reference solidarity, but rather emphasizes the danger of freeloading. The Hungarian opposition sometimes argues that Hungary should support the quota because this is what the European Union expects of us. These politicians

15 https://mno.hu/belfold/orban-viktor-az-europai-ember-all-tamadas-alatt-1267170
16 http://pestisracok.hu/orban-szerint-a-kotelezo-kvota-csak-szetteritene-a-terrorizmust/
reason that Hungary needs to do what the EU demands, as Hungarians have a lot to lose (i.e. support from the EU). The point made in these cases is not really for the quota, so much as against confrontation with the European Union.

d) In a few articles, Hungarian opposition politicians, and sometimes experts or academics, are quoted as making the point of economic rationale – Hungary (or Europe) would profit from immigration: with an ageing society on the one hand, and emigration from Hungary to Western Europe on the other, both the economy and the labour market will benefit from immigration.

Responsibility and solidarity

The discourse about responsibility and solidarity is a mixture of questions about who is responsible for what and for whom. These questions are closely bound up with how actors construct and understand what the problem is, and how they construct and understand the ‘us’ and the ‘them’. The various manifestations of these issues on responsibility and solidarity are as follows.

The first topic is whether ‘we’ (the government(s), the nation, human beings) are responsible for other human beings in general or only for members of our own community (nation/religion/race, etc.). Do we extend solidarity to other groups? Since the discourse is dominated by the government, we summarize its approach first.

The Hungarian government’s interpretation of responsibility is usually exclusive, i.e. solidarity and responsibility are limited to a group. The group may be:

2. The Roma – ‘we’, the Hungarian government, already have a minority that we are responsible for but have been unable to integrate; taking on another group that is different from us (Muslim migrants) is unrealistic.
3. Europe (which may mean European people, values or culture) – this is defended by us against both mass migration and the misguided politics of European leaders.
4. Hungary/Hungarian people – ‘our own people’: the Hungarian government’s main responsibility is for the well-being and safety of Hungarians.

This understanding of responsibility is connected to the argument that Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has made on several occasions in the Hungarian media for national solutions to the crisis:

There is a fixation in Europe, a ‘wonder blahblah’ that politicians turn to when they can’t answer a question. This is the need for a European solution. According to Orbán, the refugee crisis proved that not only do these solutions not exist, but they are not even necessary, since this has to be handled and sorted out at the national level. If a state is not able to solve the problem on its own, it may get help. But it is dangerous to create the illusion that someone in Brussels will solve the problem and protect our borders.17

On the other hand, representatives of EU institutions, Western European politicians and statespersons often emphasize the universality of solidarity and responsibility. In these statements, responsibility and solidarity are not restricted to a group: humanity is ‘our’ responsibility. These statements were

https://index.hu/belfold/2015/11/20/orban_paksrol_ahol_hus_van_ott_legy_is_van/
prominent in the aftermath of Aylan Kurdi’s drowning in the Mediterranean Sea (2 September 2015) and usually refer to shared ‘European values’ and universal human rights:

‘We are often proud of our European heritage ... Today, when people have to leave their country they flee to Europe. Europe is the continent of hope, which should be a source of pride, not fear,’ said the President of the European Commission ... According to the politician, we need to welcome refugees with dignity, because this is the European norm.\(^\text{18}\)

The second theme to emerge in the Hungarian media where responsibility is concerned is **responsibility for the crisis**: what is the crisis, what is the cause of it and who is to blame?

The Hungarian government presents various interpretations of the causes of the crisis and the parties responsible for it:

(1) The European Union is responsible, because it is slow and passive.

(2) Western European countries, the United States and the European Union are responsible for the immigration flow because they have been inviting migrants, and also because they initiated the ‘Arab Spring’ and the rapid destabilization of the entire region was a consequence of their misguided foreign policy.

(3) Migrants are responsible for not respecting the rules and culture of Europe.

Western European politicians, representatives of NGOs and the European Union and the Hungarian opposition parties have a different interpretation of what was the cause of the crisis and who is responsible for it: the Hungarian government exacerbated the negative effects of the ‘refugee crisis’ and is responsible for the suffering of vulnerable people in Hungary.

A third interpretation of responsibility in the articles examined is that ‘we are all in it together’. This interpretation includes, on the one hand, expressions of solidarity with, and gratitude to, Hungary from then Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico for ‘defending Europe’; and on the other hand, demands from Germany and the European Union that European states must share the burden of receiving migrants. In the second instance, the quota is understood as responsibility and solidarity with the states that are most affected by immigration.

**The relocation quota in parliament in 2015\(^\text{19}\)**

Despite the high level of salience in the media after the ‘hot summer’ of 2015 (Figure 3 and Figure 4) we found that the quota was on the main agenda of parliament only twice: on 22 October and 16 November 2015. In the first case, the quota mechanism was debated; in the second case, it was connected to the jurisdictional procedure, when the Hungarian government initiated a yellow-card procedure against the EU. However, during the research period there were 21 days (out of 52 parliamentary days) when the quota was referred to. On the two days when the quota was on the main agenda, the number of statements was 13 and 22 (respectively), and there was another occasion

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\(^{19}\) In this section we analyse the 103 statements from parliament with regard to the relocation quota between 1 May and 30 November. For the sake of simplicity, we use the term ‘statement’ for any type of speech, remark, answer, etc. The data were analysed using Computer Assisted Data Analyser Software (MAXQDA 12).
when there were 11 statements (when parliament discussed the modifications of the Fundamental Law of Hungary). Two things can be concluded: first, the quota received much less attention as a primary focus in parliament than it did in the media. This supports the assumption that parliament is not the main channel for government communication, but is rather a showcase. Second, if we look at the number of statements that were made when another issue was on the agenda, we can say that the quota was a tool for MPs, to be used to make arguments for or against other issues relevant to the specific debate.

Analysing the composition of statements by party affiliation, we found that the right-wing opposition Jobbik dominated the scene: while they had 12% of the seats, they accounted for 31% of the statements. Altogether 43 MPs made at least one statement, but one of the Jobbik representatives made 19.

Regarding the type and length of statements, the most frequent were those prior to the agenda (37%) and general statements (22%). Statements made prior to the agenda receive the greatest media attention, since media reports usually cover what happens in parliament in the mornings.

A relevant aspect of the discourse is how MPs identify the target population. As Table 1 shows, the most frequent term is ‘immigrant’; the terms ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’ are used with equal frequency, while ‘asylum seeker’ is used less often. As for party affiliation, the most biased term (‘immigrant’, which wrongly assumes that those entering Hungary intend to stay) is most likely to be used by the governing party. The most legally correct term (‘asylum seeker’) is used mainly by the non-right-wing opposition parties. These findings coincides with the dominant terminology of used in the online media, as well as the terms regarding the ‘refugee crisis’ (e.g. MPs also often used terms such as ‘invasion’ or ‘flow’).

| Table 1 Frequency of the words used about the target population, by party affiliation (%) |
|-----------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------|----------|--------|--------|
| N                                      | Fidesz-KDNP | Jobbik | Other | Total |
| Immigrant                              | 195         | 78     | 16     | 6      | 100    |
| Refugee                                | 108         | 52     | 18     | 30     | 100    |
| Migrant                                | 100         | 36     | 56     | 8      | 100    |
| Asylum seeker                          | 52          | 29     | 6      | 65     | 100    |

Regarding the relocation quota, neutral terms were used, such as ‘relocation quota’, ‘quota system’ and ‘European quota’. An emotionally more loaded term – the ‘mandatory quota (system)’ – was introduced by the member of government responsible for communication:

Let’s be honest, the quota means mandatory settling. It means that the European Union wants to settle immigrants in an obligatory fashion in the nation states, regardless of what the national parliaments or the national governments think. Further, neither the European Parliament nor the Committee in Brussels is interested in the people’s opinion. (Antal Rogán, 2 November 2015)

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20 The equivalent of the Constitution.
21 Using a term which scapegoats the EU became more frequent during our research periods, but was first used in this speech in November, i.e. at the end of the first part of our research period.
Other negative terms in relation to the quota discourse were ‘invitation letter’ (referring to Merkel’s initial role in the process) and the ‘population exchange’. The former (used by MPs from the ruling party and Jobbik) emphasized that, as Antal Rogán said, ‘the quota means invitation for the migrants’. The latter (used solely by Jobbik) refers to historical events, when the population was forcibly resettled on the basis of ethnicity:

... what is happening to Hungary is a consciously, mostly well-organized catastrophe, which is manifested in an invasion and projects a population exchange if the Hungarian government cannot do anything against the emigration of hundreds of thousands and lets the European, so-called liberal forces settle many thousands by quota or by resettlement to Hungary. (Z. Kárpát Dániel, Jobbik, 28 September 2015)

**Topics related to the quota: demography, crime and integration**

In this section, we present the main themes that were attached by the MPs to the quota: demography, labour market, crime and integration. They overlap but do not completely coincide with those of the online media: the labour market and crime were discussed, but the question of demography and integration were less prominent in the online media.

Several statements were devoted to the issue of **demography and the labour market**, when speakers raised the issue of the population decline. They usually argued that the quota should not be used to solve labour scarcity:

there are countries in Europe, which, due to demographical reasons or because of lack of labour force, want to choose this solution to increase the number of tax payers. This is their business, but we think this problem should be solved nationally. (János Lázár, minister)

He continued by saying that the national interest was more important for Hungary than the number of tax payers; therefore, Hungary should instead invite ethnic Hungarians from neighbouring countries, if it had demographic problems or a labour market shortage. The concept of national interest is key in the government rhetoric. The same idea was expressed by Imre Vejkey (an MP from KDNP) as early as June 2015:

the majority of the opposition parties want to solve the demographic problem with immigrants, but the majority of Hungarian families do not share these parties’ standpoint.

The theme of **crime** covered several different issues. At the level of individuals (immigrants/asylum seekers) it referred to terrorism, human trafficking and illegal border crossing; at the institutional level, it referred to the question of registration and not enforcing the rules of the Dublin regulations. As to terrorism, the prime minister said that ‘not all immigrants are terrorists, but all terrorists are immigrants’ and that is why Europe should not open its borders.

The third theme is **integration**, including cultural differences and the preservation of the ‘European identity’. Another minister (Lajos Kósa) summarized this argument:

So far, we do not know any successful, reassuring integration model, and this was expressed by European countries ... [Angela Merkel said this] The multicultural model has failed in Germany and in Europe generally.

By ‘European identity’, the MP meant the ideal of a Christian Europe: ‘it is the obligation of the Hungarian government to warn Europe about the danger of distancing itself from the ideal of a Christian Europe’.

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Arguments

Prior to analysing the arguments pro and con, it is important to mention the general attitude to the quota. None of the parties find it an adequate answer to the refugee crisis, but there are some (non-right-wing opposition parties) that would accept it as a temporary solution, whereas the ruling coalition (Fidesz–KDNP) and Jobbik completely reject it. However, while the governing coalition talks about its rejection of the quota, Jobbik speaks of ‘zero tolerance’ of immigration generally. The overall attitude of parliament is not pro-refugee: even the leftist and more liberal parties employ a careful rhetoric, emphasizing immediate help for those in need, but avoiding the oft-quoted accusation of being ‘migrant-lovers’.

The main pro arguments were humanitarian values (such as solidarity): the importance of cooperating with the EU and of choosing the ‘lesser evil’ versus the Dublin regulations. The cons were that it does not offer a solution, is impracticable, and raises fears for the consequences (of immigration or acceptance of refugees) and for the protection of national interests.

Solidarity and humanitarian values were mentioned by all parties. However, most of them added that these apply exclusively to those who are eligible for asylum, and not to economic migrants, who only come to Europe in search of a better life. No MP suggested that Hungary or Europe should open the borders and let everyone in. Jobbik emphasized that the help should only last until the situation improved in the sending region, i.e. in a legal sense, nobody should be granted refugee status – only temporary protection. Even the foreign minister said that

the correct policy is not to send invitations under the ‘quota’ pseudonym to those who want to immigrate, but to help refugees to stay as close as possible to their homes until the conflict which makes them leave has ended. (Péter Szijjártó)

Responsibility was also a pro argument, which meant that being part of a member of the EU comes not only with rights, but also with obligations. As a socialist MP put it, ‘rights and obligations should come together within the EU as well’ (Attila Mesterházy). According to several leftist representatives, building a fence will lead to the demise of the Schengen Agreement, which will ultimately be at the expense of Hungarian émigrés (by restricting freedom of movement) who live in other European Union countries. The responsibility issue was approached differently by government representatives: according to them, it is the duty of Hungary to protect/defend its and Europe’s borders against ‘illegal infiltrators’, and Hungary is in the forefront of this task by building fences. Their proposal is to establish a common border protection on the Greek border, with the participation of all Member States. Furthermore, responsibility referred to the past as well: many MPs (regardless of party) deemed the EU and especially the USA responsible for the crisis situation. Therefore – according to these MPs – it should also be their task to solve the problem. (This is what the ‘world quota’ proposal was about, but it was also rejected in most cases.) ‘Cooperation’ in the government representatives’ statements means the Visegrád Four countries teaming up against the EU over the quota.

Regarding the ‘lesser evil’ argument, the quota was compared to the alternative that the Dublin agreement offered. András Schiffer, a representative of LMP, summarized the problem thus: rather than the 1,300 refugees assigned to Hungary under the quota system

if Hungary sends such a message that we are not interested in a common European solution, we do not know what happens if they want to send 50,000, 100,000, 150,000 people who are registered in Hungary.
The frequently mentioned impracticable/unrealistic argument covers several con issues. First of all, it was claimed that the quota did not use accurate figures, because by the time the proposal appeared, there were far more asylum seekers on the continent than when the original calculations were made (using the figure of 120,000). Secondly, forceful resettlement is against human rights. As a Jobbik representative said:

We, Jobbik, do not understand why the liberal colleagues do not protest loudly because they want to resettle people within Europe with force, keeping them somewhere with forced methods where they do not want to be.

The argument put forward by the prime minister (with whom Jobbik is more or less in agreement on the quota question) was that ‘the refugees cannot decide to which country they want to escape’. Thirdly, the question of capacity also arose. The prime minister summed matters up rather crudely: ‘We cannot maintain all the economic migrants.’ In this context, by ‘we’ he meant Europe. One unique argument was the unfairness of the quota – i.e. the Western countries will take in the most educated refugees and send the rest to Central Europe to create social tension.

Fear of the consequences of taking in the refugees was also often raised. Some MPs tried to scare their audience with statistics – they expected the number of arrivals to increase because of family reunifications and the high fertility rate of the refugees:

> in most cases family reunification does not mean only one wife or one or two children, but much bigger families, and we can say that the thousand people that you want to settle in Hungary could mean 40–50,000 mass in twenty years’ time. (Dániel Z. Kárpát)

This would also mean abuse of the welfare system by asylum seekers. Lastly, a recurring theme was the protection of the national interest, including both the cultural and the legal dimension. In terms of the former, it meant protection of the Hungarian (and European) identity; in terms of the latter, the main topic was the subsidiarity and sovereignty of the Member States vis-à-vis the EU.

**What changed (or did not) in the discourse on the relocation quota/quota referendum in the period of the ‘quota referendum’ in 2016?**

The so-called quota referendum contained only one question: ‘Do you want the European Union to prescribe the mandatory settlement of non-Hungarian citizens in Hungary even without the consent of Parliament?’ As a phase in the process of pressing the moral panic button, the referendum was nothing more than a campaign with a simple pro-government (and anti-EU) message (Picture 1), which was reinforced before, during and after the referendum by an ‘information campaign’ with messages in the media (Picture 2). Aside from billboard campaigns and direct political advertising in the media, the government used its dominance in the mass media to spread its message. A study observing the coverage of television channels during the lead-up to the quota referendum illustrates the bias of pro-government channels quite lucidly (Annex 2). In the first two columns, we find the official public service TV (M1) and a commercial channel owned by an oligarch from the top government circles (TV2). Compared to the other three television channels, these two channels (especially the state-owned one) focused very heavily on the refugee issue/referendum, almost exclusively promoting the government’s position and encouraging voters to turn out at the polls.

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The national referendum on the quota was held on 2 October 2016. It was legally void, because less than half of the eligible population voted. However, of those who did vote validly, 98% were against the quota. Therefore, the government had two mottos – ‘Hungary has decided’ and ‘Hungarians are united’ – alluding to the fact that the nation’s attitude toward the quota was clear, regardless of the referendum’s invalidity. It is hardly surprising that the government’s interpretation of the referendum should serve as the basis for a new wave of media and billboard campaigns (Picture 3).

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23 The government’s message printed on the national colours of Hungary: ‘Do not risk the future of Hungary! Vote NO!’

24 ‘Did you know? From Libya alone one million immigrants want to come to Europe’ and ‘Did you know? The terror attack in Paris was committed by immigrants.’
Institutionally, however, by now the referendum had an important consequence – modification of the Fundamental Law to refuse any form of EU quota in the name of ‘constitutional identity’, which was to be restored by not allowing foreigners to settle in the country.

**The relocation quota in the online media during the ‘quota referendum’ of 2016**

Below we give an overview of the main characteristics of the coverage of the so-called ‘quota referendum’ in Hungarian online media. The time period is 1 June to December 2016.

The most important observation is that even though the quota itself was an integral part of the coverage of the ‘quota referendum’, the focus in the media shifted to other topics (internal politics and strategies, the campaign itself, etc.). This shift coincided with the decreased presence of European actors in the coverage. When the quota was brought up (usually by the Hungarian government), the same tropes and arguments appeared as in the quota debate (national sovereignty, security, the cost of immigration, etc.).

**Frames**

Regarding the main frames used in the Hungarian media, the ‘internal politics’ frame dominates. The common interpretation of the situation is that the referendum was initiated mostly for political purposes by the Hungarian government (to keep migration on the agenda, to strengthen the general anti-EU narrative and – ultimately – to sustain or even boost the popularity of the governing party). Therefore, discussions revolve around whether the government (and Prime Minister Viktor Orbán) succeeded or failed in this. Opposition politicians are discussed in terms of their success in responding to the challenge posed by the government and their success in making the most of their interests.

The ‘power struggle’ frame that dominated the quota debate in 2015 was also present and widespread. In this phase, the frame included calls for national sovereignty and a war against the ‘nihilist elite’ that

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25 ‘We have sent a message to Brussels: 98% – NO.’
had taken over the institutions of the EU, and the ‘terror of a minority’ that ‘we should get rid of’. This is the frame that the Hungarian government advanced, and it dominated the government campaign (billboards, town-hall meetings with government officials, advertising, etc.).

The campaign itself became one of the main topics of the coverage, with two related frames: the ‘effectiveness’ frame and the ‘economy’ frame. In the former case, articles reported on the various phases of the campaign and discussed their persuasiveness and credibility, including the veracity of statements. In the latter, we find articles about the estimated costs related to the campaign, mostly public funds spent by the government. In some cases, this frame included references to potential corruption in the distribution of public funds to private media companies.

The government pushed the ‘representation/democracy’ frame, which interpreted the referendum as proof that the government – unlike the alienated European Union – was keen to listen to the people:

> It seems like Hungary is the only country among the EU Member States where the voice of the people is heard – said the minister [Antal Rogán].

This frame goes together with the ‘power struggle’ frame, especially with discussions on the alleged rule of the ‘European politically correct elite’.

### Actors

There were some changes observed as far as the actors are concerned – most notably, non-Hungarian actors (EU representatives, European politicians, etc.) were much less visible in the Hungarian media during this period. Even though they rarely appeared in the Hungarian media at this time, European politicians were often referred to by government politicians as the opposition (or even the enemy) that ‘we’ must fight.

Among Hungarian actors, government politicians had a strong presence, but this time the opposition was also visible. Some new actors also appeared on the scene: civil society organizations (NGOs) and a ‘spoof’ party (Ketfarku Kutya or Two-Tailed Dog Party) gained significant visibility as well. Arguably, the above-mentioned focus on the campaign led to the visibility of these new actors: they played a role in reflecting on the campaign in various ways. For example, the Two-Tailed Dog Party ran a campaign to encourage people to cast invalid votes (with support from crowdfunding). Another set of new actors were the so-called ‘security experts’, who propagated the government’s message in the media and at town-hall meetings, reinforcing the simplistic version of the government’s ‘terrorism/security’ frame:

> I’m saying the Arab is fine, but then comes the Afghan, with zero schooling, and then the Black Africans, I have no idea what we will do with them … I took the train from Brussels. It was a huge mistake. I went to the train station and I freaked out, though I am not easily scared. I was the only white person.

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27 https://index.hu/belfold/2016/10/05/tobb_milliard_kellett_a_migransellenes_harchoz_mint_a_kormany_allitotta

28 https://index.hu/kultur/media/2016/10/12/eleg_jol_jart_a_mediaworks_a_kvotakampannyal/


30 https://index.hu/belfold/2016/09/30/a_jo_dontes_georg_spottle_szemelyeben_csucsosodik_ki/
The dichotomies observed in 2015 were also present: the main difference was in who was billed as the ‘enemy’. Government actors still actively cited the European leadership as the naive/oppressive/anti-democratic/delusional/weak ‘them’, compared to the well-prepared/active/democratic/strong ‘us’. European politicians rarely commented on the referendum. Hungarian opposition politicians also engaged in constructing these dichotomies by using moral and democracy-related arguments, describing the Hungarian government as corrupt/immoral/anti-democratic, etc.

Arguments

The arguments were more or less the same as in the previous period. There were, however, new elements in the way responsibility and solidarity appeared in the media in the second period. Such new elements were, for example, (1) the emphasis on the economic burden on Hungary of the quota, and (2) the lack of solidarity with ‘us’. According to this argument, the burden was being increased by the attitude of the West, particularly Germany, which

invite them [the migrants] in, then pick whom they need, then distribute the rest to poorer countries of Europe ... this way richer countries would like to shift the burden of maintaining these people to Central Europe ... This region is expected to show solidarity of a Western European standard ... But how could someone on a 300 Euro pension help Africa?

Part of this argument was that ‘we’ had done our share by building the fence and protecting the borders of Europe; therefore, Europe should not expect more from ‘us’.

Another new element was the blame game among Hungarian politicians: who was responsible for the future demise of Hungary? Government politicians called opposition parties traitors for not trying to stop the introduction of the quota (‘which will ruin Hungary as we know it’). On the other hand, Jobbik argued that it was indeed the government, and Prime Minister Viktor Orbán personally, who were responsible for introduction of the quota, as the unsuccessful referendum (initiated by the government) would be used against Hungary by the EU. Leftist and liberal parties and civil society actors blamed the government for the growing xenophobia and for the hateful and fearful environment it created in the country for its own political ends.

The relocation quota in parliament during the ‘quota referendum’ of 2016

As for parliament, between June and December 2016 there were 91 statements in regard to the quota and the referendum. These 91 statements were made by 40 MPs, and about a quarter of them (26 statements) by Csaba Dömötör, the state secretary in charge of communication. The prime minister made four speeches during this period. By party affiliation, the ratio was different from the previous period: Fidesz dominated the debates, with 78% of statements (while they had only 66% of the seats in parliament). Most of the statements – as in the media – contained several references to domestic politics: such as criticizing other parties’ actions, opinions and stances on the referendum in relation to other issues (often in a very repetitive way).

The issues regarding the quota referendum were very similar to those of the previous period. The themes that came up prior to the referendum were related to the wider context of the referendum (i.e. the refugee crisis and the related fears of accepting immigrants/refugees) and domestic politics, with the opposition blaming the government for corruption and double standards, and the
government blaming the opposition for not campaigning for people to vote in the referendum. After the referendum, the government celebrated the result with mottos such as ‘Hungary united’ and ‘Hungary has decided’, while the opposition focused on the poll’s invalidity.

Prior to the referendum, the right wing argued that

[In the West] the question is not whether to live in a multicultural society or not, but how to live in a multicultural society. For us, here, in Central Eastern Europe, we have the chance to choose whether we want a multicultural society or not. (Gábor Vona, Jobbik)

He argued against it by referring to the parallel societies and the no-go zones in Western countries. Government MPs agreed with this view:

It seems that the settlers want to possess only the end result of the European Christian culture: the living standards created by cooperation and mutual respect. But they refuse the belief, the worldview, and the moral and secular habits on which it is based. That is why the mass settlement is risky: because with the increase in the crowd, the rejection of a European lifestyle increases and the protection of habits experienced in different circumstances strengthens. This is what is called parallel societies. (Márta Mátrai, Fidesz)

To narrow down the issue, the right wing presented several dangers of the quota system. First, there was no limit on the number of refugees, which meant that a huge volume could arrive in the coming years. As a Fidesz representative said,

We need the referendum because the Committee in Brussels want to reinforce an immigrant relocating mechanism on the Member States, according to which the EU institutions decide about the relocation of the immigrants based on a mathematical formula. Hungarians are preparing to say no to this and to uniformly declare: only they can decide with whom they want to live and no one has a say in this. (Alpár Gyopáros, Fidesz)

Another problem, related to the number of migrants, was family reunification: with the country having to accept family members, the number of refugees would increase immensely. Furthermore, under the quota, Member States that did not abide by the rules would have to pay a huge amount of money (i.e. there was a financial punishment). Prime Minister Viktor Orbán (12 September) summed up the government’s position: ‘we are afraid of the flow because of the civilizational differences’; but because ‘we don’t have a heart of stone, we need to find an answer to this challenge which is moral and at the same time rational politics’ – a feature of the Hungarian standpoint. Therefore, he proposed ‘to give help there but not to bring the problem here’.

Beyond reacting to the likely negative consequences of the refugee crisis, the government wanted the referendum to legitimize an amendment to the Fundamental Law. The leftist opposition argued that it made no sense:

This referendum is senseless, because you cannot solve the refugee crisis with it. Unnecessary, because whatever the result may be, it binds neither Hungary nor the EU. Lying, a bluff, because the mandatory settling quota in the question was not and will not be an issue. Expensive, because they have spent so far more than 11 billion forints from public funds for the media campaign, while there is no money to increase the number of ambulances. And cynical,

32 At this point there was a reference to the favouritist/corrupt nature of this funding.
because it generates incitement against Syrians, Afghans and other refugees who are escaping from war. (Bertalan Tóth, MSzP)

The day after the referendum, a state secretary (Csaba Dömötör) said that ‘Of every ten people, nine think we have to stand up for ourselves.’ Or as the state secretary of the Ministry of Internal Affairs said cynically, ‘So, we send a message to the migrants: they can stay wherever they are or they should go home.’

The main outcome of the referendum was the government proposal for an amendment to the Fundamental Law to reject any form of EU quota. As Béla Dankó, a Fidesz MP, explained: ‘Brussels cannot settle immigrants in Hungary without the Hungarian parliament’s approval, because this is a question of sovereignty.’ The amendment therefore would not allow collective settlement. Sovereignty equals ‘constitutional identity’, which should be restored by not allowing foreigners to settle in the country. The right-wing opposition (Jobbik) supported the idea, but found the referendum unnecessary, as Gábor Vona said, addressing the prime minister:

It took you to waste 15 billion forints and an unsuccessful referendum to realize again that Jobbik is right regarding the amendment of the Fundamental Law: we recommended this [idea] to you half a year ago.

The leftist opposition did not take part in the discussion. The amendment did not receive the two-thirds majority that was needed (Jobbik also voted ‘no’, alongside the other opposition parties), and therefore the proposal was not accepted.

Conclusions

In Hungary, the government dominates most political and social spheres. From our point of view, this means hegemony in two of the main forms of the public sphere – the media and parliament. The functions of parliament as a forum for public debate on important issues and as an institution that can hold government accountable have been significantly reduced. The opposition’s right to form parliamentary committees of inquiry is limited and crucial laws are passed without any meaningful discussion, including the media law, the constitution and the electoral law. The recent changes to the constitution of Hungary have handed the prime minister the greatest possible formal power in a parliamentary democracy, leading to an ‘executive’ type of parliament (Toth, 2017) or autocracy (Kornai, 2016). The media are heavily dominated by the government, while independent, critical journalism is shrinking and is reaching fewer and fewer members of the public, as an increasing share of the population can only access media that carry the messages of the government (European University Institute, 2016).

According to the de Wilde model, politicization consists of three components: salience, polarization of opinion and the expansion of actors and audiences. In Hungary, the salience of the migrant quota topic has increased significantly. There is a polarization of opinion; however, the process is a long way from the Habermasian concept of public discussion and articulation of opinions. Both in the media and in parliament, the debates show a powerful dichotomy and an intense opposition of views. Since one of the characteristics of the debate is a continuous identification of the enemy/ies by the government, most arguments lack detail, reference to facts, and sophistication. As a related point, there is no sign of a motivation for consensus: on the contrary, the quota debate is used by the government only as a theme in the constant power struggle. The third component of de Wilde’s politicization is also problematic: we have not observed an expansion of actors in the discourse. On the contrary, there has
been a sort of dualization: the two camps are the government (with ‘its’ civil actors, intellectuals and media) and a shrinking, conflict-riven and controlled opposition.

As for the politicization process, we could observe a pattern: government communication leads the discourse with its messages; this then shapes the discourse in parliament and the media; and finally the public gets ‘(in)formed’. Frames and interpretations that challenge the narrative of the government are present, but are audible only in ‘echo chambers’, and they are not strong or loud enough to influence the course of the process.

Since early 2015, the issues of migration in general, and the relocation quota in particular, have been captured and used by the government to win popularity and to frame the political discourse in the public sphere. To achieve this, a unique mass-manipulation technique has been developed – the so-called ‘moral panic button’. This is a long-term, high-cost manipulation technique which monopolizes all forms of media and reduces the room for manoeuvre of non-governmental actors. Through this mechanism, citizens can be reached with messages that are tailored by professional framing experts to influence the way they think, feel and behave. Both public opinion research and the results of the 2018 parliamentary election show that the Hungarian public is dominated by pro-government attitudes – whatever the topic – and that the popularity of the governing political forces can be kept at a high level by using the moral panic button.

Among political scientists, debate is raging about the extent to which we should identify the contrivance, fine-tuning and continuous adaptation of the moral panic button as a ‘simple’ mass-manipulation technique or as a core element of autocratic rule in the postmodern era. Since we do not want to get into this debate here, we only refer to those elements of the processes that we have analysed and that should be taken into consideration in further research. Such as whether Orbán applies ‘event-making’, rather than ‘eventful’ leadership techniques (Metz, 2017); Orbán’s application in all topics of increasingly aggressive language and militaristic vocabulary (Magyar et al., 2018); and the question of whether this is an essential part of the postmodern form of autocratic and radical governance, which aims to maintain a high level of vigilance using a special framing strategy called ‘allusions to conspiracies against Hungary/ians’ (Kopper at al., 2017: 120).

We consider the repeated, systematic pressing of this moral panic button to be strategic, moral panic-mongering by the government, which profits from this distorted form of politicization by gaining popularity, votes, etc. The government ignores the potential long-term negative effects of the process, such as increasing xenophobia and decreasing tolerance. Moreover, it seems to build on these developments to create an ethnocentric cultural milieu and to engage in ethnocentric biopolitics (fighting against ‘non-Hungarian’ art and science, developing patriotic education, supporting married heterosexual couples with at least three children, prioritizing Hungarians living across the border, etc.) (Melegh, 2010; 2016). Referring to the very first pressing of the moral panic button (the speech Orbán gave after the Charlie Hebdo terror attack), Melegh (2017: 87) wrote:

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33 An excellent analysis of the case of a counter-billboard campaign in the social media (Nagy, 2017) showed that even the very innovative mockery of the official campaign can have only a temporary and limited impact on a closed group of anti-government enthusiasts.

34 A sophisticated descriptive analysis (both text and images) of the Hungarian media on a large corpus consisting of articles from 25 Hungarian media (Balogh et al., 2016; Fülöp et al., 2017) illustrated the main characteristics of the bias of the media.

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Orbán utilized the nationalist critique of pro-Western liberal discourses: Hungary has always been European and a defender of Europe and we need no ‘Europeanization’, or liberal preaching about anti-racism. He combined this reclaimed and conservative Europeanness with the social exclusion and social competition discourses of the previous socialist governments against immigrants, who, according to these public discourses, are supposedly taking jobs from local Hungarians. And then, with a stress on defending Hungarians within and outside Hungary, the prime minister amalgamated all the above with the topics of securitization and the dangers of the ethnic/racial/religious mixing of populations via referring to the special status of Hungary and Eastern Europe within Europe. This use and recombination of discursive traditions has led to a hegemony in which counter-discourses remain suppressed or unsuccessful (silent), a fact which can be demonstrated not only by the dominance of the above discourses, but also by the knowledge that the 2016 ‘anti_quota’ referendum and the positions of the government were counterbalanced by the silence of opponents and abstentions from voting.

As to the concrete characteristics of the quota debate in these trends:

(1) In Hungary the quota debate has been captured by politics. Politicians are the main actors in the media; the main frames used are embedded in and serve the political interests of the government; the framing of the problem and the solutions offered all revolve around power struggles and are based on deploying the moral panic button.

(2) The quota is rarely discussed in relation to what is really happening with regard to migration in Hungary: the topic has a life of its own. With some exceptions, the quota debate gets detached from other, concrete issues and experiences in Hungary, and is discussed in the context of the government’s interests in local and European politics. The exceptions are such dramatic events as when refugees start marching toward Austria from Budapest’s Keleti railway station or terrorist acts abroad. In the case of the former, the march appears as a reference point for pro_quota European and EU politicians arguing for the need for a humane solution and calling for solidarity (where the quota system represents solidarity with the refugees). Terrorist acts spark the opposite frame (Szalai and Göbl, 2015): that of security and terrorism (where the quota system is a risk, or even an attack on Europe, Hungary, Christianity and ‘our culture’).

As for parliament, none of the parties find the quota an adequate answer to the refugee crisis. The overall attitude of parliament is not pro-refugee: even the leftist and more liberal parties employ a careful rhetoric, emphasizing immediate help for those in need, but avoiding the oft-quoted accusation of being ‘migrant-lovers’. The main pro and con arguments reflected those in the media. The main pro arguments were solidarity, the importance of cooperating with the EU and of choosing the ‘lesser evil’ (over the Dublin regulations); meanwhile, the con arguments stressed that the quota does not offer a solution, is impracticable, and raises fears for the consequences (of immigration or acceptance of refugees) and for the protection of national interests.

35 Strong arguments to prove this thesis are that: (1) Since 2015 there have been almost no asylum seekers in Hungary (96% of asylum applications were disrupted, since the applicant had left Hungary, and 86% of the rest were rejected) and the number of illegal border crossings is lower than in 2014 (Juhász and Molnár, 2016; National Police Service, 2017); (2) However, officially in Hungary today there is a massive refugee crisis, since the government keeps on extending the application of a sort of ‘martial law’ under Act CXL of 2015, which introduced the concept of the mass immigration crisis situation.
We can conclude that even though the issue of migration – and the relocation quota in particular – has reached a high level of salience in Hungary, because of the uniquely strong role of the government, the theoretically crucial element of the politicization process – i.e. the ‘competitive representative claims-making in the public sphere’ (de Wilde, 2011: 572) – is missing.
References


### Annex 1

**Table 1** Milestones of the refugee crisis in Hungary (January–October 2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date (2015)</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11 January</td>
<td>The first relevant official statement related to immigration into Hungary: Prime Minister Orbán’s speech in Paris after the commemoration ceremony for the victims of the <em>Charlie Hebdo</em> terror attack: economic migration is bad, Hungary will therefore not provide asylum for economic migrants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>Preparations begin for the so-called ‘national consultation’ on immigration initiated by the government (mailing a questionnaire to all Hungarian adults to canvass their opinion on immigration). Increasing number of anti-immigration communiques by politicians in the government.</td>
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<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>‘National consultation’ on immigration.</td>
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<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>Government-sponsored anti-immigration billboard campaign nationwide; a counter campaign is organized by a fringe political party with pro-immigration messages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25–30 June</td>
<td>The formation of the new voluntary grassroots organizations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 July</td>
<td>The Hungarian government starts building a fence along the Hungarian–Serbian border.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5–8 August</td>
<td>The opening of transit zones at railway stations in Budapest with the volunteers and grassroots providing street social work and aid for asylum seekers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 August</td>
<td>71 dead migrants are found in a van in Austria close to the Hungarian border, obviously en route from Hungary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25–29 August</td>
<td>Negotiations are under way about a central transit zone in Verseny Street, Budapest, controlled by the Municipality of Budapest.</td>
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<tr>
<td>end of August–early September</td>
<td>Increasing tensions at the Budapest railway stations, where thousands of asylum seekers are waiting for the opportunity to travel on to Germany. Tensions are increased by the erratic reactions of the Hungarian authorities and the state railway company: at one point no asylum seekers are allowed on the trains leaving for Germany – even those with valid tickets; later it is again possible to get on the trains for a few hours, but then all international trains leaving for Germany are cancelled for a few days; on 3 September a train leaves Budapest Keleti railway station with asylum seekers who were informed that they are heading for Germany; the train, however, is stopped at the Bicske reception camp (Hungary), with asylum seekers feeling cheated and trapped.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 3–6 September| Right after the train incident at Bicske on 3 September, asylum seekers at Budapest Keleti railway station set out to walk to Austria along the M1 motorway. In response, the government provides buses to transport the asylum seekers direct to the Austrian border from the motorway and from
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date (2015)</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Keleti station. A statement is made by the head of the Catholic Church in Hungary, Cardinal Peter Erdős, justifying the limited involvement of the church in the crisis, in stark contrast to statements made by the Pope.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 September</td>
<td>Petra László, a camerawoman for a right-wing Hungarian TV channel, trips refugees running from the police at Röszke (Serbian border).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15–16 September</td>
<td>‘The battle of Röszke’ takes place between police and asylum seekers after the physical and legal closure of the Hungarian–Serbian border. The migration flow heads towards the Hungarian–Croatian border.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 September</td>
<td>The Hungarian–Serbian border is closed down.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21–23 September</td>
<td>Repercussions of a speech delivered by Prime Minister Orbán, who said ‘the government has given financial support to the NGOs’; the volunteers and grassroots protest, as they have in fact not received any state funds; the prime minister meant only those established charity organizations that were commissioned by the government with providing aid at the Croatian and Austrian borders after 15 September.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 October</td>
<td>The fence along the Hungarian–Croatian border is completed, the border is closed: the end of the mass inflow of asylum seekers and migrants into Hungary.</td>
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</tbody>
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Annex 2

Some characteristics of the media bias during the quota referendum

The research project CEASEVAL ("Evaluation of the Common European Asylum System under Pressure and Recommendations for Further Development") is an interdisciplinary research project led by the Institute for European studies at Chemnitz University of Technology (TU Chemnitz), funded by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under grant agreement No 770037.) It brings together 14 partners from European countries aiming to carry out a comprehensive evaluation of the CEAS in terms of its framework and practice and to elaborate new policies by constructing different alternatives of implementing a common European asylum system. On this basis, CEASEVAL will determine which kind of harmonisation (legislative, implementation, etc.) and solidarity is possible and necessary.