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Foreword

Tárki’s biannual Hungarian Social Report has been published in October, 2016. Since its first publication in 1990, the report aims to give a balanced overview on the Hungarian social trends and processes of the past two years. The report of 2014 was published through crowdfunding, only by civil support, which shows the need for evidence-based, objective analysis of social trends in Hungary. In 2016, the report was again financed by the Ministry of Human Resources. The studies of the 2016 Social Report present a comprehensive picture on the most important trends and figures of the Hungarian social, economic, and political scene.

The Social Report 2016 reports on improving labour market situation but also highlights risks of misinterpreting data on public works. It is underlined that the Hungarian economy appears to be dual, with a well-functioning sector dominated by multinationals while domestic industries and SMEs showing signs of struggle. Other papers warn about increased corruption risks and weak competition in public procurements – with structural funds being at higher than average risk. Chapters on social structure highlight that income and wealth inequality is at a relatively modest level, but the average living standard is at a low level, there is a narrow and weak middle class and a large deprived segment of the society. For the first time the report includes estimates of the Hungarian wealth distribution. The chapters on health, education and social policy systems explore urgent needs for reform to tackle large health inequality by education subgroups and also to strengthen policies to alleviate intergenerational transmission of disadvantages.

What follows is a collection of abstracts of the individual chapters. Authors were asked to summarize their chapters in a few short paragraphs, illustrated by one or two figures from their papers. Authors can be contacted for further details.

Chapter downloads, media coverage, history of the Hungarian Social report series is available at


Corresponding editor: István György Tóth (toth@tarki.hu)

For further information on the report please contact Orsolya Szabo (orsolya.szabo@tarki.hu)
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1. Economic developments

1. Wage convergence – potentials and limits (Éva Palócz)

The study examines the relationship between wages and productivity in Hungary not on macro-economic level, as usual, but intends to show what differences lay behind the national averages in different types of companies. It aims to contribute to answering the question what would be the major impacts of an excessive wages increase, over the relative increase of productivity in the Hungarian economy.

According to the study, the Hungarian economy can be characterized by a very strong and unhealthy duality both in European and regional comparison. The productivity of domestic-owned enterprises lags behind that of foreign owned companies much more than in neighboring countries, and in recent decades the gap between the two business segments has not diminished.

The article moreover finds out that the share of domestically owned medium and large size corporate sector with relatively higher productivity has not strengthened in the last decade, but on the contrary: it has been rather shrunk, both in terms of number of companies and number of employees. The number of employees at domestic large enterprises decreased, while that at micro firms increased in the last decade.

Figure 1. Value added and labor cost per employees
As the author states, due to the current significant differences in salaries, a radical and sudden wage increase would have dramatic consequences among small size enterprises. However, the market itself will point, in the not too distant future, into the direction of wage increases. The shortage of labor what we have already experienced, will force an increase in wages, which could lead to a significant restructuring in the private corporate sector.

If a significant wage increase will occur, which cannot be followed by low-productivity small companies, then a flow of labor into the more efficient corporate segments may start. This transition will peacefully take place only if the wage increase will be gradual and allows time to adapt for the weaker companies.

The results of the study provide counter-argument for those who like to blame global multinational companies for present problems of the Hungarian economy. We can raise the question, how would the average wage level and productivity of the economy without foreign firms in Hungary? Foreign-owned companies are paying salaries in excess of 60% of the private sector average. However, three-quarters of employees find work at domestic firms, so the level of salaries are determined by them; the foreign companies match this wage standard to and only pay so much more as is necessary to ensure their labor supply. If
the domestic economy would strengthen, and therefore would dictate higher overall wage level, the foreign companies would calculate higher wages in their return on investment.


This study examines the corruption risks and the competitive intensity of the Hungarian public procurements between 2009 and 2015. As if somebody would like to cheat – to be corrupt – then he or she will set up the conditions that make corruption possible. The presence of corruption risks means that such conditions exist in the public procurements. The paper is based on the investigation of 127,776 contracts belonging to the 86,814 public procurements in the examined time period extracted from the website of the Hungarian Public Procurement Authority. As the quality of the raw data is poor because of misspellings, inconsistencies and missing information, thorough data cleaning procedures had to be done before the analysis.

The indicator for corruption risks is based on two components: the number of bidders and the transparency of the tender (was it announced or not). If there was only one bidder (indicating that there was no competition between potential winners of the tender) and the public procurement was not announced, it will result in a high value of the corruption risk indicator. The competitive strength is also measured by the number of bidders.

The results indicate that in cross-national comparison, the competitive strength is irregularly low and corruption risks are unusually high in the case of the Hungarian public procurements.
In addition, both of these indicators show a negative tendency in the examined time period. The weakening competitive strength was followed by rising corruption risks.

Furthermore, an unexpected negative impact of the funds from the European Union were pointed out based on the analysis: the corruption risks are higher and the competitive strength is lower in the case of the public procurements supported by the EU in comparison to the ones with purely domestic financial background.

Source: own calculations of CRCB based on the data of TED
N:413 910
3. Employment change since 2008 in Hungary (Ágota Scharle)

The employment rate in Hungary has been steadily increasing since 2010. The paper examines the reasons behind it and whether the data on improvement is realistic or rather misleading.

First it calculates the magnitude of two factors that improve employment statistics but may not be fully attributed to autonomous labor market processes: the share of Hungarians employed abroad and the fast-increasing share of public works participants (who are both counted among the employed in official statistics) (Figure 5).

Second, it compares the evolution of the employment rate in Hungary to employment in other post-Socialist EU member states, to show that (once deducting employees abroad and public workers) recent Hungarian performance has not been particularly strong (Figure 6).

Lastly, the paper decomposes the sources of recent employment growth into changes in the composition (regarding age, education and gender) of the labor force as opposed to changes in the labor supply behavior of subgroups within the population (some of which may be a response to policies, such as a rise in the pensionable age). The main lesson of the last part is that changes in the age and educational composition played a minor role (Figure 7). By contrast, pension policies appear to have had a significant influence: the gradual rise in the
pensionable age and tightening early pension rules increased employment in pre-pension age groups until 2013 when conflicting policy changes enacted in 2011 halted this trend (Figure 8). The figures below summarize the main results of the paper.

Figure 5. Employment rate of population age 15–64 in Hungary, 2008–2016 quarterly (%)

Figure 6. Employment of the population age 25-64 in Hungary and selected CEE countries, EU15 average =1

Source: own calculations based on data from Eurostat online Labour Force Survey (Ifsa_ergaed). Includes employees working abroad. Note: *without public works participants.

Figure 7. Decomposing rise in the employment rate in Hungary between 2008 and 2015

Figure 7/a. Composition effects

Figure 7/b. Parameter effects

Source: own calculations using HLFS first quarters. Excludes public workers, people working abroad and full time students. Population aged 15-64.

Note: Columns show the share attributed to the particular component in explaining the total difference between employment rate in 2008 and employment in the given year.
II. Social structure

4. Middle classes in Hungary and in Europe (István György Tóth)

Although inequality of incomes is not larger in Hungary than it is in an “average” EU country and the share of middle income groups is also similar to the average in Europe, by measures broader than income, the middle classes in Hungary are narrow in terms of people and weak in terms of wealth and income reserves of middle income people. Furthermore, deprivation analyses, consumption categorizations and multidimensional social stratification analyses have shown that what is traditionally called the ‘middle class’ should be sought somewhere in the upper third of Hungarian society (see Table 1). This share of the ‘real’ middle class is certainly higher than it was 100 years ago, but much lower than it should be, especially with a view to establishing a stable and balanced social structure in Hungary.

The chapter first looks at the various factors that lie behind the historical weaknesses of the Hungarian middle classes, as well as the social, economic and political developments as a
result of which the middle classes remain weak even 25 years after the political changes in 1989–90.

Then the chapter overviews a recent research on the disappearing middle classes in Europe\(^1\).

### Table 1. Prevalence of various deprivation items in various income brackets in Hungary, 2014 (percentage of people in the various brackets reporting the given problem)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inability to meet unexpected expenses</th>
<th>60–80 (poor)</th>
<th>60–80 (lower middle)</th>
<th>80–120 (core middle)</th>
<th>120–200 (upper middle)</th>
<th>200+ (well-off)</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inability to meet unexpected expenses</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem going on holiday</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem paying utility bills</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem buying meat</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem paying for heating</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No washing machine</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No colour TV</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No telephone</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No car use</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of at least three items</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of at least four items</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of three ‘middle class essential’ items</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Author’s calculations based on Tarki Household Monitor 2014.

When searching for the reasons of this, the chapter identifies a number of factors behind. First, middle classes have never been strong in Hungary. The social and economic structure of the country prior to the Second World War was characterized by the dominance of agriculture with only embryonic industrialization; strong concentration in both agriculture and industry; a high degree of inequality in wealth and earnings; and, as a consequence of all

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\(^1\) Vaughan-Whitehead, D. ed. 2016. Europe's Disappearing middle class? Evidence from the world of work. Edward Elgar
this, a dualistic social structure. Second, the post-war communist period brought about widespread social mobility in the country, but some two-thirds of Hungarian society could be described as ‘status inconsistent’, occupying different positions in the various dimensions of stratification, with inconsistency prevailing primarily in the middle of society. Third, the way how the transition was managed has led to a large-scale drop in employment equilibrium – from a seemingly high but very inefficient level of employment to a regime characterized by very low employment and a high rate of exit from the labor force. Under the badly calibrated social and economic policies in most of the transition years, large low educated masses ended up outside of the labor force for a long period, boosting productivity in competitive sectors but causing large efficiency losses at the level of the whole society. Forth, the privatization process motivated by huge debt legacy from socialism, dominated by management buy-outs and high speed large scale sales did result in slow and hesitant development of home grown enterprises. Altogether this did not sufficiently contribute to strengthening of the Hungarian middle class. Fifth, public sector – a traditionally important provider of middle class jobs (consider health, education, welfare personnel, etc.) remained to be unreformed for a very long time. Lack of efficiency in these sectors did mean overemployment AND underpayment for many – a fact sufficient in itself to explain why middle income classes are weak in terms of assets and savings. Sixth, institutions of tripartite social dialogue, in existence for the first 20 years of the transition, gradually lost their strength and were dismantled by the government in 2010. Trade unionism is very fragmented and weak in Hungary leaving only marginal role for competition between them, concerted actions have very low chances. With no powerful tripartite bodies in operation, the amendments of the Labour Code enabled employers to impose more ‘flexibility’ and thus much less ‘security’ for many middle-class jobs.

5. Wealth distribution in Hungary (Tamás Kolosi– Zoltán Fábián)

This chapter analyzes the distribution of wealth in Hungary by combining macro and micro statistical data. The later come from the 2015 TÁRKI Household Monitor survey where about 72 thousand billion HUF total net household wealth with 11 million HUF median per households were registered. Due to several reasons this micro estimation is lower than the macro data which is about 90-100 thousand billion HUF. Financial assets and equities are strongly underreported in household surveys. However the values of real assets like household main residence, other real estate properties, cars and other vehicles could be reliable estimated from micro sources. One of the main characteristic of the Hungarian wealth distribution that very high proportion of households (95 %) own their residence. However, 50 percent of households are fortuneless having less than 7 million HUF assets and only 5 percent are wealthy having more than 70 million HUF. The distribution of wealth is more unequal than income distribution and strongly related to regional and income position, educational background and subjective class identification.
From comparative perspective households net worth is highly correlated with the economic performance of countries as it is expressed in GDP figures. The Hungarian inequality of wealth is lower than in other countries, for example in the USA.

Table 2. Wealth distribution in Hungary, 2015: a macro estimation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wealth strata</th>
<th>Percent of households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fortuneless (less than 7 million HUF assets)</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global middle stratum (between 7 and 70 million HUF assets)</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealthy (over 70 million HUF assets)</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within the wealthy stratum</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70–150 million HUF assets</td>
<td>4,4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150–300 million HUF assets</td>
<td>0,3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300 million HUF – 3 billion HUF</td>
<td>0,3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 3 billion HUF</td>
<td>150–200 households</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors own calculation

6. „Burgerschaft“ (Endre Sik – Blanka Szeitl)

The authors of the chapter define citizenship by the combination of its three components: to be born, to live and to think as a citizen. To become a citizen one should meet with at least two of these three criteria which were operationalized as being born in an educated family with books in a house or flat owned by the family, to have enough income and wealth to feel economically safe while living in a good neighborhood, and believing in democracy and belonging to the middle class. Living in a city, being educated, having many books and a command of at least one foreign language are the main factors of making someone a citizen in contemporary Hungary.

According to Eurostat data for 2015, relative income poverty in Hungary is below the EU average: the at-risk-of poverty rate of the Hungarian population was 14.6 %, while the EU average reached 17.2 %.

Contrarily, the share of Hungarian people living in material deprivation is the third highest in the EU, following Romania and Bulgaria: in 2014, 44 % of total population was affected compared to the EU-average of 19.5 % (see Figure 10).
According to results from TÁRKI Household Monitor survey, material deprivation rate reached 53% in 2009 and increased slightly further till 2012 (56%). This peak was followed by a considerable decrease till now in two steps: 45% in 2014 and 36% in 2015.

Individual items contribute to a different extent to these overall figures. In 2015, close to 70% of the Hungarian population lived in a household unable to cover unexpected expenses by the end of the month and two-thirds of the population could not afford to go for a one week holiday during the year. One could observe lower incidence in the case of the other items (Table 3).

The labor market attachment of the household, the attained educational level and the ethnic background of the household head are the most important factors that are correlated with the risk of living in material deprivation. The material deprivation rate in the very low work intensity (MI < 0.2) households was 60% in 2015, while the same figure was 46% in the case of the low work intensity (0.2 < MI < 0.45) households. Those living in households with a Roma head, the incidence of material deprivation was 64% (compared to 21% in the non-Roma population) in the same year.

More than 4 out of 5 people living in material deprivation belong to households where the household head has a primary (or lower) education, while about half of them (46%) live in households where the head is not employed.
Table 3. Indicators of material deprivation and deprivation rates by individual items (%), 2009-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of material deprivation</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Material deprivation (according to at least 3 items)</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severe material deprivation (according to at least 4 items, EU2020)</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Individual items**

Due to lack of resources, the household cannot afford

| ...to face unexpected expenses | 76.8 | 80.9 | 72.8 | 68.4 |
| ...one week holiday | 75.7 | 77.1 | 65.2 | 65.0 |
| ...to eat meat (or protein) regularly | 41.3 | 44.7 | 37.1 | 27.4 |
| ... a car | 28.6 | 28.6 | 25.2 | 24.2 |
| ...to keep their home adequately warm | 19.8 | 27.4 | 19.0 | 13.4 |
| ...to pay their rent, mortgage or utility bills | 20.8 | 24.3 | 14.0 | 12.7 |
| ...a phone | 13.5 | 3.5 | 2.9 | 2.6 |
| ...a washing machine | 10.1 | 7.5 | 6.0 | 4.7 |
| ...a colour tv | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.4 |

*Source: own estimates based on TÁRKI Household Monitor Survey.*
8. Consistent poverty in EU members and in Hungary (Anna B. Kis – András Gábs)

The paper focuses on examining the relationship between the income and the material deprivation concepts of poverty by identifying the main factors that affect the risk of consistent poverty, compared to exclusive forms of poverty—i.e. living in income poverty only or living in severe material deprivation only. The authors applied the method proposed by Nolan and Whelan (2011a,b) to measure consistent poverty in the European Union. Accordingly, people facing both the risk of income poverty and the risk of severe material deprivation were considered to be living in consistent poverty.

The share of those living in consistent poverty is highest in the New Member States and the Southern countries, and a higher at-risk rate is associated with higher rates of consistent poverty. Our analysis showed that consistent poverty is present in all European Union Member States, even in the most affluent societies. The incidence of consistent poverty, however, varies greatly across countries, with higher-than-EU-average figures in the New Member States (the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Slovakia being exceptions) and in some of the Southern countries (Cyprus, Italy and Greece).

Figure 11. Consistent poverty in EU Member States, 2012 (%)

![Consistent poverty in EU Member States, 2012 (%)](image)

Source: authors’ figure based on EU-SILC 2012.

The risk of living in consistent poverty correlates strongly with household characteristics related to social status, independently of the reference group used in the analysis. This reinforces the claim that all EU countries should strengthen their efforts to decrease the risk
of poverty by focusing on those most in need: low-skilled workers, work-poor households, large families, etc. Furthermore, our results highlight that there are important differences in terms of which factors shape the comparison of living in consistent poverty compared to living in income poverty only or in material deprivation only. This finding suggests that those living in poverty or social exclusion are far from consisting of a homogeneous group, so the most vulnerable can be better identified and monitored.

While the analysis lacks country-level detail and as such is not suitable for use in making national-level policy conclusions, some country group-level policy conclusions still can be drawn. That there is a need for a strong focus on families with children in the Southern countries and in the New Member states is a clear message. In addition, the accentuated role of education in the New Member States indicates that there is a significant mismatch between skills and available jobs on the labor market which should be tackled by the education system.

III. Household behavior during and after the crisis


The article analyses how household savings and debts have changed during the period 2008-2015. In addition, using data from the special module in TARKI Household Monitor 2015 survey the chapter also studies whether households affected by the crisis were using savings and debts as a coping strategy.

First, the study describes the macro-financial environment of the savings and indebtedness of households. Net financial savings of Hungarian households were low before the economic crisis (below 2% of GDP in 2008). One reason was increased indebtedness of households, but the decline in accumulation of financial assets also contributed to the fall in net savings. From 2008 net financial savings have increased, which was mainly due to decreasing liabilities, although from 2012 increasing accumulation of financial assets also contributed to the change. By the year of 2009, the tendency to take out loans had significantly decreased which was partly explained by the change of loan conditions in Hungary.

Based on the Household Monitor survey the study analyses how the proportion of households with different kinds of savings and loans have changed and also studies the socio-demographic determinants behind these changes. Household savings behavior is potentially affected by a range of motivations, such as saving to finance inactive phases of the life-cycle, saving to leave inheritance, saving to cope with uncertainties (eg. unemployment, illness), or finance entrepreneurship. The most common type of savings in
2015 was life insurance. Ownership of different savings instruments are influenced by the financial situations of the households, and factors that are correlated with household income, such as age and education. Education seems to be a significant factor in taking out life and health insurance as these are much more common among people with higher education. Inhabitants of the capital city, the wealthier, and people in relationships are more likely to keep their savings in banks.

The proportion of households repaying bank loans was increasing in the beginning of the 2000s, but after 2010, the number of families paying installments decreased. Younger people, people in relationships and with children, people with the lowest income and inhabitants of cities are more likely to be paying off loans. According to the study, paying installments became less hard for households by 2015 in comparison with 2010.

Lastly, the article examines how savings are used in financial crisis situations. Assets of households (real estates, financial assets, vehicles, consumer goods, or enterprises) can be used to raise money in crisis situations. Since 2007 16% of those households that had savings or assets, used these to raise liquidity. Another way of covering financial shortage is taking out formal or informal loans and 24% of households chose this option. As it has been demonstrated, those households that had been affected by some kind of crisis situation are more likely to sell their assets or take out loans. The tendency to take out loans decreases with age. Education is an important factor in selling assets: while 22% of people of lower education tried to earn money by selling assets, only 12% of people of higher education chose that way of making money.

The study thus shows that savings related strategies were used by households to cope with the economic crisis, but also points to the drawbacks of these strategies. Using savings to cover everyday expenses is only possible for households with significant wealth holdings. Relying on formal loans became more difficult during the crisis years as conditions for bank loans were hardened, which is shown by the importance of informal lending.
The aim of this study is to present and to analyse main trends on household’s consumption since 2007-2008 recession. In the first part of this paper we interpreted macro statistics published by the Eurostat and the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (HCSO), in order to make cross-country comparison with the neighbouring countries. The main section of the study provides a detailed analysis of consumption data collected in 2015 by the TÁRKI Monitor Survey. Finally, a short section is devoted to the analysis of the Hungarian households’ reactions to the economic recession, focusing on the following question: how the households have adjusted their consumption to a declining income situation.

Applying Eurostat’s macro data of Actual Individual Consumption, we presented figures on the volume of consumption in the V4 region (The Czech Republic- CZ, Hungary- HU, Poland- PL and Slovakia- SK), firstly in absolute terms, then relative to the EU15 (i.e. to old member states). We underlined the fact that, while in 2003 the rank among these countries was as follows: CZ (consumption level of the EU15 was 63%), HU (58%), SK (48%), PL (47%), in 2015 the order of countries has changed totally: SK (71%), CZ (70%), PL (68%), HU (57%), which
means that the Slovakian economy has achieved 23 %-point upward convergence, and Hungary “has gained” -1 %-point. See dynamics over time in Figure 13.

Figure 13. Relative Actual Individual Consumption to EU15, 2003-2015

![Graph showing relative actual individual consumption to EU15 from 2003 to 2015.](http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=prc_ppp_ind&lang=en setting: ‘AIC’ és ‘volume indices of real expenditure per capita in PPS (EU27=100)’.

Note: in PPs

According to the latest TÁRKI Monitor Survey Hungarian households consumption expenditure was 158 thousand HUF per month, in other terms, 78-79 thousand HUF per capita. These figures correspond well with preliminary data of the HCSO, which was 74 608 HUF per capita per month. An important finding is that the long period of contraction seems to be finished and the increase of consumption expenditure, started in 2012, is continued.

Analysing the basic socio-demographic characteristics of the Hungarian households, the most important predictors of the level of consumption are the followings: the size and income of the households on the one hand, and the labour market position and the educational attainment of the head of the household on the other hand. In other words, the highest levels of consumptions are most likely to be achieved if the head of the household has tertiary education level, works as an intellectual or enterpriser, or if the household belongs to the highest income quintile. Vice versa, if the head of the household is less educated (less than secondary education), economically inactive, or the household belonging to the bottom income quintile the households’ consumption level measured to be relatively low. The correlation between the households’ size and its consumption level is
negative, meaning that the larger the household the smaller is its level of consumption per capita.

As a reaction to the crisis, one out of three households decided to reduce their consumptions on fashion-related or electric products, and one out of four households needed to economise on their basic needs as food and 20% of the households spent less on cigarettes and alcohol by necessity.

11. Work intensity during the crisis and the recovery (Réka Branyiczki)

The recent financial crisis hit Hungary hard, the recession had strong detrimental effects on the labor market and the well-being of households. When assessing the labor markets impacts on well-being it is crucial to consider how the diminishing jobs during the downturn, and then later on how the emerging positions during the recovery are distributed among the households. Therefore the paper concentrates on households’ work intensity, which is an indicator of the level of labor market integration of the household based on the working time and working hours of the active aged members during the last 12 months\(^2\). The analysis is based on the 2009, 2012, 2014 and 2015 waves of TARKI Household Monitor, which is a cross-sectional survey on well-being, employment and attitudes in Hungary.

Employment rate is generally low in Hungary since the economic transition (approximately 67% during the crisis years 2008-2009, compared to 76% in the EU28, Eurostat 2016a\(^3\)), which is exacerbated by the uneven distribution of jobs across households. On average 12% of the population below age 60 lived in a household with very low work intensity (0.2) during 2006-2015, whereas the same indicator remained under 8% in the Visegrád Group countries (Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Poland) since 2008 (Eurostat 2016b\(^4\)).

\(^2\) Household work intensity is an indicator defined by Eurostat, which takes values between 0 and 1, based on the ratio of working time of active aged household members divided by the potential, full-time working time of the active aged household members.

\(^3\) Eurostat 2016a: Employment and activity by sex and age – annual data.
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-datasets/-/LFSI_EMP_A (Downloaded: 2016. 05. 05.)

\(^4\) Eurostat 2016b: People living in households with very low work intensity.
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tipslc40 (Downloaded: 2016. 06. 16.)
Figure 14. The distribution of people across households with different levels of work intensity during the years 2009, 2012, 2014 and 2015. The definition of the household work intensity categories: very low: 0–0.2, low: 0.2–0.45, middle: 0.45–0.55, high: 0.55–0.85 very high: 0.85–1.

According to TARKI Household Monitor Data almost 30% of the population below age 60 lived in a low-work intensity (below 4.5) household in 2009, which gradually decreased to 15% up to 2015. Data indicates that those who live in households that are weakly integrated on the labor market are less educated and older on average, compared to their peers with higher household work intensity. Education seems to be the most important underlying factor, the permanent divide between less (grammar school) and highly educated (higher education) further increased during the crisis. Low educated people reported more job losses during the times when labor market was shrinking. Accordingly, they also gave account of more take-ups of extra jobs in the household to ease the financial hardship. Still, the instance of extra jobs fell far behind the number of job losses in these households. All in all, work is an effective safety net against poverty - only 1-4% of the people of very high household work intensity fell under the relative income poverty threshold during years 2009-2015 compared to 46-65% of the people living in households with very low work intensity – however, the more vulnerable groups are often deprived of its benefits during economic downturn.
IV. International migration, refugee situation

12. Emigration, immigration and the Hungarian labor market (Ágnes Hárs)

In Hungary, emigration has started late and has considerably accelerated since 2010 when the intensity of emigration has already been close to that of other new EU member countries like e.g. Poland although it has remained far behind that in Romania or the Baltic countries. Migration has remained stable and has become part of the every-day while the level and the pattern of migration have turned to be similar to the other new EU countries. Remarkable, emigration is coinciding with return migration as well.

In 2010, following a set of measures of the newly inaugurated conservative government the social network has been weakened and various groups were forced to (re)enter the labour market. Participation rate as well as unemployment rate has increased while emigration took off. Since 2013, however, labour market trend has improved, unemployment rate decreased, employment rate increased and shortage of skilled labour has occurred. (A vast public work scheme has been introduced, bias of labour market indicators following from official calculation have been corrected). Labour emigration remained permanent but the increase of emigration stock has slowed down.

The labour market improvement – decreasing unemployment and increasing employment – has been coinciding with increasing public work and continuous – although somewhat calming - emigration. All in all, emigration had little effect on national labour market development, i.e. on decreasing unemployment. The chance of foreign employment is decreasing if the person has been unemployed (and likely even more so if he/she had public work). More likely, the (provisory) labour market improvement had some influence on the intensity of emigration, similarly to the experiences of other new EU countries although causality is vague. Labour emigration intentions seem to be responsive to the labour market development with calming the intensions, while non-labour purpose emigration intensions seem to be increasing.

On the national labour market labour shortages have occurred. Labour emigration is responsible only for a part of shortages mostly in particular jobs, professions. As a labour market response, we would expect wage increase where collective bargaining would have essential role. Remarkable, however, wage increase has been moderate with the exception of the highest level wage group where people are the least involved in emigration. Immigration, more precisely channelled immigration to compensate the shortage of labour has been outlined as vague and indefinite possibilities yet.
With increasing emigration, the *possibility* of emigration has been considered as an important option for various groups involved. Thus, the benefit of emigration might be overrated; migration strategies or decisions regarding education etc. will be influenced by these kinds of migration decisions. The migration networks are important in the spread of this perception and migration narratives are widespread in culture and in everyday discourse. Possible Hungary, as a latecomer in migration, made the culture of migration relatively strong. No further verification in a short time.

Figure 15. Labour market development and the changing number of labour emigration, 2009–2015

![Graph showing labour market development and emigration changes from 2009 to 2015.]

*Source: own calculations* based on HCSO LFS corresponding years, own calculations based on mirror statistics, EUROSTAT, Labour shortage: Kopint-Tarki conjuncture survey, 2016

13. European refugee crisis: the special case of Hungary in it (Attila Juhász – Csaba Molnár)

Migratory processes, societal attitudes connected to them, and politics affect each other mutually. This was also proven to be true during the European migration crisis starting in 2015. The public’s evaluation of the refugee crisis in Hungary was shaped largely by politics, especially by the government’s campaigns related to the topic. Two extreme viewpoints started to dominate the domestic public discourse regarding refugees. One considered the
refugee wave to be a threat to Hungarian culture and national security, while the other attested that it was a faux, an essentially non-existent problem thought up to generate political gains. The facts and data presented in this study indicate that none of the two extremes matched reality.

From the beginning of 2015, the political discourse on the refugee crisis generated the feeling that Hungary’s position had generally changed in the global migratory system. However, data suggests that the only alteration Hungary has had to face as a result of the migration crisis is the increasing number of asylum-applications.

Figure 16. Number of asylum-seekers arriving to Hungary

![Bar chart showing number of asylum-seekers arriving to Hungary (1989-2015)](image)

The refugee wave did not match migratory processes Hungarian society had been used to. The potential of political hysteria generated by the refugee crisis to shape reality and its larger-than-expected effect originate in societal attitudes. Within the global migratory system, individual European countries are connected to different, historic migratory sub-systems. In the actual target countries within the systems, there are migratory networks to which those arriving with the refugee wave can connect. The colonial past, former guest-worker schemes, or the more frequently used sea migration routes can equally form the basis of these networks. In Hungary, such networks have never existed, thus the government could present measures (e.g. closed borders) as effective that would be less useful to introduce in the actual target countries.

Due to the unique case of Hungary, the Orbán-government’s stance on refugees has become important internationally as well. The Hungarian government was right in pointing out that
EU officials for a long time had only been focusing on countries to which migrants arrive through sea routes, Italy and Greece, not paying attention to that Hungary is also under significant migratory pressure by people arriving on land. This was later acknowledged by the EU and more influential leaders of member states, based on the European Commission’s proposal from December 2015, Hungary became a beneficiary together with Italy and Greece. The country became more noticeable as a result, however, the Hungarian government refused the proposal and the quotas, even as a beneficiary. In countries where 98% of asylum-application procedures are cancelled because the applicant leaves them, there is no lasting interest in a quota-system designed to relieve pressure on countries with a high number of refugees. If we only consider the migratory process without taking party politics into account, this is the reason why Hungary refused the implementation of the quota system together with other Eastern European countries that were not significantly affected by the refugee crisis.

14. Emergence of new form of help and solidarity: old and new voluntary organizations (Anikó Bernát – Anna Kertész – Fruzsina Mártta Tóth)

The study presents and analyses the motivations and attitudes of volunteers and established aid agencies which were helping the migrants during the 2015 Hungarian migrant crisis. The evolution of the solidarity movement of grassroots organizations and volunteers, as well as the established aid organizations which provided aid for the migrant people in this period can be understood in the context of the national and local socio-political context of the summer and autumn of 2015 both in Hungary. In Hungary, which can be characterized by a high level of xenophobia, a low level of trust, civil and voluntary activity.

Appropriate actions or rather the lack thereof followed the government’s anti-migration rhetoric, both by the governmental agencies with an interest in migrant aid, and by some of the largest humanitarian aid NGOs. The strongly communicated rejection of the asylum-seekers and migrants by the state and its agencies was in stark contrast with the welcoming atmosphere of most EU countries, including the main target countries, Germany and Sweden, although it was obvious for all stakeholders, that Hungary is only a transit and not a target country for the migrants. As a response to the masses of migrants piled in busy public spaces of large cities of Hungary a spontaneous solidarity movement appeared in the streets of these cities mainly based on the wish to provide relief to vulnerable people, especially children in need, accompanied by the general passivity of both the authorities and most established NGOs working in this field, especially the large charity organizations, as well as the volunteer individuals’ and grassroots organizations’ oppositional political stance all played a motivational role in their volunteer civic activity. The newly formed volunteer-based and hierarchy-free organizations were quite successful regarding resource and
volunteer mobilization. According to our findings, one of the main reasons behind their success was their “low entry threshold”; volunteers only had to get to one of the train stations, bringing a bag of food as donation or could immediately join the aid work.

The study based on individual interviews and focus group discussions. It is important to note that the volunteers who spontaneously joined the relief work supporting migrant people constituted a heterogeneous group. Many new volunteers became voluntary aid providers due to purely humanitarian reasons. Others were involved personally, or through family members and acquaintances and named this connection as their main reason for joining. Only the further remaining members’ motivation can be explained by mostly political reasons.

Newly formed grassroots organizations clearly functioned as a counter power to the government’s policies, but in the case of media use, although they were highly visible, they were not able to dominate the communication field as the government had a strong communication strategy and campaign that was backed by their wide range of media channels. Beside the intensive activity of the online and offline media and the TVs and radio broadcasting, the most important features of the refugee crisis in 2015 were the new, intensive communication and organization of the work through social media and other internet-based technologies. The role of Facebook and other social media platforms played a huge role in the information exchange between individuals and the organization of group activities. This technical inventory was available for refugee helpers, it is in fact probably no exaggeration to say, that the refugee aid movement in 2015 (Hungary) would not have existed without Facebook.

V. Institutions, welfare state

15. Schools run by the state, the local governments, the churches and foundations (Zoltán Hermann– Júlia Varga)

Since 2010 significant changes took place in the distribution of schools and students by school-providers. The share of pupils studying in church-related schools has increased, and the share of students in private schools has decreased considerably. The rise of enrollment in church schools was especially large in the economically less developed regions and smaller settlements. The decrease in private education took place primarily in secondary vocational education and schools providing education for students with special education needs.

Changes in the enrolment shares were accompanied by changes in student composition. Before 2010 students from low SES families were underrepresented in both private and
church schools. For 2014 this has reversed in some tracks of the upper-secondary education, mainly due to the increasing concentration of church schools in poor regions. At the primary and lower-secondary level church and private schools preserved the above average share of high-status students.

The results on differences in student test scores and school value added are mixed. Church-related primary and lower-secondary schools seem to have a slight advantage in reading, while at the upper-secondary level church and private schools lag behind state schools both in reading and in maths.

Figure 17. Private and church school enrollment share in primary and lower secondary education (general schools) and the three tracks of upper-secondary education, 2001–2014 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>State schools</th>
<th>Church schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

szakiskola = vocational school

gimnázium = academic secondary school

szakközépiskola = vocational secondary school

általános iskola = general school

16. Health status, health inequality, international comparisons (Éva Orosz – Zsófia Kollányi)

The paper describes the trends and the social determinants of health status of the Hungarian population, with an international comparison in focus.

From the mid-1990’s life expectancy started to increase in Hungary – after a long-lasting trend of continuous decrease, that began in the mid-1960’s, and further accelerated following the democratic change in 1990. The first main result of the paper is that in spite of the improvement, the country is still lagging behind the average of EU15 and the three other
members of the Visegrad group to a greater extent than it was at the end of the 1980’s regarding numerous important measures of health status.

The second important point of the paper is that health status of the Hungarian population is worse than it would be expected based on the economic performance of the country.

Thirdly, the slight increase in life expectancy of the total population since the mid-1990’s was accompanied by enormous increase in the health-related inequalities.

Moreover, the paper shows that health inequalities by educational attainment are much deeper in Hungary than in the EU15 countries on average, regarding both objective and subjective measures.

The last important research result is that the level of amenable mortality, a measure indicating the overall performance of the health system, is especially high in Hungary.

The following data illustrate these research findings. In 2014, life expectancy of Hungarian man at age 40 was 6.8 years shorter than life expectancy of males at 40 in the EU15 and 2.2 years shorter than in the 3 other Visegrad countries. The same figures in 1989 were 6 and 1 year, which reflects a significant widening of the gap. However, it is not just the length of life that matters: another crucial issue is the length of life lived in good health, a.k.a. the healthy life expectancy. At the age 65 Hungarian men’s life expectancy is an additional 14.6 years, 40% of which they may expect to live in a good health; while additional life expectancy for women at age 65 is 18.6 years with 30% of it to be lived in good health. The same figures in the Czech Republic are 53% of an additional 16 years for men and 47% of an additional 19.8 years for women.

Social inequalities of health status have also increased during the past decades enormously. The life expectancy of men at age 30 with lower-secondary education at most (ISCED levels 0-2) is 10 years shorter today than of those with a high school degree or higher educational attainment (ISCED levels 3-8)– the figures are 36.4 years versus 46.1 years respectively. In the mid-1980’s this difference accounted only for 6 years. The geographical distribution across different regions of Hungary are also highly unequal: life expectancy of men living in the most disadvantaged microregion is 13 years shorter than life expectancy of those living in the most advantaged microregion.

Factors affecting health status can be grouped into three main categories. The first group of factors are structural: economic, social and socio-psychological/cultural determinants belong here, along with the governmental social policy measures and the stratification of the population by income, educational attainment and employment/occupation. The second group consists of the so called intermediary determinants of health: factors that directly affect health status. These are properties of the physical and psychosocial environment, and
health behaviour like diet or the presence of health damaging habits. The third group of factors is directly related to the health care system: for instance if the health promotion programs reach those mostly endangered, and how unequal the access to and the quality of care is across the population – a distribution that is highly unequal in Hungary.

The Hungarian health care system is in the state of deep crisis, as a consequence of the serious cut in public health spending in real terms and also as a share of the GDP, accompanied by the structural problems of the system. The level of amenable mortality, a measure reflecting the overall performance of the health system clearly indicates this: amenable mortality is 2.5 times higher in Hungary than the EU15 average and 40% higher than in the Czech Republic. Regarding total mortality these figures are 1.5 and 18% respectively. This means that the consequences of the reduction of public spending on health care – which in terms of share of GDP is more or less continuous since the mid-1990’s – can be measured in human lives.

Figure 18. Life expectancy at 40 years by educational attainment, 2013 (years)

Source: Eurostat [demo_mlexpecedu] and [demo_pjan]

Note: weighted average. ISCED 0-2: lower-secondary education at most (without degree); ISCED 3-4: higher-secondary education at most (with degree); ISCED 5-8: tertiary education
Figure 19. Relative mortality by the main categories of the causes of death in Hungary, age 0-64. EU15=1. 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010.

**Source:** Sándor (in press)

**Note:** Standardized death rates.
17. Age profile and territorial distribution of services and users (Róbert Goldmann–Gellért Gyetvai – Dániel Mester)

This study was designed to show how the Hungarian social welfare system affects the gender, age and geographical characteristics of beneficiaries. The social system is not simply the sum of responses to specific client needs. It is often affected by latent forces creating a special pattern and causing an uneven distribution of services by territorial access, age and gender.

The spreading of services (in addition to client’s needs) is affected by service maintainers, service providers (interested in self-sustainment), services’ policy, international trends, as well as regional differences in development, employment and income. The system is thereby an active social and political stakeholder, and cannot be regarded as a simple sum of reflections to specific needs.

Data show that out of the 22 types of services examined only 4 almost entirely determine the age and gender composition of beneficiaries (family care, home care, day-care and social meals). The number of recipients of these services comprise more than two thirds (72.6%) of all beneficiaries. The proportion of women in practically all services exceeds that of men (except for child welfare and child protection services, where the opposite is the case). The mechanism is that these four dominant types primarily target the elderly, and as women typically live longer, sex ratios of clients due to the characteristics of the types of services favor women. Meanwhile, the areas examined produce characteristics differing from the distributions of the population by age group and sex.

All these affect regional differences too. For example they influence the take up of social and / or child welfare basic care, or the size or type of municipality one is living in. Considering forms of care, take up of basic services is outstanding in villages, while towns take leadership in residential services. A linear trend can be observed in the number of recipients per 1000 inhabitants from the capital towards villages. This means that not only in nominal terms, but also proportionally small villagers take up most intensively the social and child protection services.

The development index is also an effect. Considering recipient rates, there is always a linear relationship between the size of settlement and the settlement development index. The more underdeveloped the settlement, the higher proportion of recipients of social and child welfare services. A 2.9-fold difference can be observed between the two extreme categories.

In summary it can be said that although in theory the coverage of services is the same throughout the country (or at least it broadly follows conceived demands), client’s proportions and socio-demographic characteristics of clients are more often influenced by other effects mostly in the background determining the actual operation of the sector.
There are approximately 48 thousand people with intellectual disabilities and/or autism in Hungary (2011 Population Census), and it is estimated that one in three live in long-term residential care, predominantly large institutions.

Deinstitutionalization, the replacement of residential institutions with community-based services or supported living style arrangements for people with disabilities, has been one of the key policy developments in many countries over the past few decades. In Hungary, despite efforts to reform social care, institutions are still the dominant type of service and relatively few places are available in small-scale community-based homes. The Government launched a major infrastructure development program in 2011 aiming to close institutions and replace them with smaller scale supported accommodation.

This chapter gives a brief overview of key policy developments in social care for people with disabilities since the regime change and compares the quality of life of adults with intellectual disabilities or autism in three different residential arrangements – residential institutions, smaller group homes, and private households – using empirical data.

The study used a matched samples design: participants were matched on the basis of their adaptive skills related to activities of daily living (e.g. washing, dressing etc.) in three groups – people with intellectual disabilities, people with profound intellectual and multiple disabilities, and people with autism. Within each group, quality of life outcomes were measured and compared across three living arrangements: institutions, group homes (8-12 places), and private households.

Information about quality of life was collected via structured interviews with people with disabilities and their careers. Data collection instruments were developed using the internationally accepted definition of quality of life as a multidimensional concept.

The size of achieved samples was as follows: 99 people with intellectual disabilities (institution: 33; group home: 33; private household: 33); 93 people with profound intellectual and multiple disabilities (institution: 31; group home: 31; private household: 31); people with autism (group home: 30; private household: 30).

The results showed that people with intellectual disabilities in residential settings (institutions and group homes) experienced better overall quality of life outcomes than those in private households. There were no differences in the overall quality of life of people with profound intellectual and multiple disabilities or those with autism living in the different residential arrangements.
Some of these results seem to contradict the general consensus that smaller scale community-based living arrangements provide better quality of life outcomes for people with intellectual disabilities. However, the findings should be interpreted with caution and in the context of Hungarian service system: residential services often provide a range of other services (e.g. employment) and community-based services in Hungary are typically much larger (i.e. 8-12 places) than similar services in other countries (4-6 places). The findings also highlight the difficult situation of households supporting adults with intellectual disabilities, in particular very limited access to support, services, and activities. Improving the situation of people with disabilities living with their families should be a priority alongside deinstitutionalization in Hungary.

This chapter is based on the research study Quality of Life and Costs of Living and Services for Disabled People commissioned by the Equal Opportunities of Persons with Disabilities Non-profit Ltd. (Fogyatékos Személyek Esélyegyenlőségéért Közhasznú Nonprofit Kft.; FSZK) and Hand in Hand Foundation (Kézenfogva Alapítvány) and funded by the PROGRESS Programme of the European Commission in 2015-2016. An English summary of the full research is available here: http://www.tarki.hu/en/news/2016/items/20160408_fszk_en.html

VI. Values and attitudes

19. Work values in the world (1990–2014) and in Hungary (Gábor Hajdu – Endre Sik)

In the course of their analysis the authors examine how important work is for a respondent as a part of their life and identity. The basic problem in analyzing generations stems from the fact that the effects of age, time period, and birth cohort are closely intertwined. To solve this problem hierarchical age-period-cohort (HAPC) regression models were developed to avoid problems stemming from the linear dependency of these three dimensions of time. The data consisted WVS, ISSP and ESS. Significant gaps between birth cohorts with respect to relative centrality of work were not found, however within all generations the importance of work becomes more important as the respondent enter into the labor market and the opposite trend when (s)he leaves it. Moreover, there is a slow but worldwide decline of the importance of work. In Hungary in 2015 the various aspects of work attitudes depend to a large extent on the position in the labor market, from the education level and social status.

5 The detailed analysis can be find on the home page of the STYLE project: http://www.style-research.eu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/ftp/D_9_1_Value_system_shared_by_young_generations_towards_work_and_family.pdf
Figure 20. Age, period, and birth-cohort effects on relative centrality of work in the total sample and in the young (18–40 years old) cohorts (hierarchical age-period-cohort regression model*)

*The y-axis shows the predicted value of the dependent variable (for an average respondent). Period panel: the dashed line shows the result of interpolation for the years with missing data. Birth cohort panel: the dashed line displays the five-year moving average.

Figure 21. The proportion of those for whom independence and social environment are important at the workplace by labor market groups (%)
20. Attitudes towards refugees and migration policies (Bori Simonovits – Blanka Szeitl)\(^6\)

This paper aims to assess the public attitudes towards the different aspects of the EU migration policy as well as people’s attitudes on asylum-seekers. The relevance of this issue is obvious, due to the recent refugee crisis and the terrorist attacks in Europe and worldwide. Our data analysis is based on several international –most importantly on the European Social Survey and the Eubarometer– comparative researches, a regional survey (in the framework of the CEORG cooperation) as well as on TÁRKI’s longitudinal survey on xenophobia.

Recent cross country data analysis revealed that European countries showed different levels of anti-immigrant sentiments as well as various views on the European migration process. Overall, we found that European countries can be separated by a geographical and also by a political axis. Based on the geographical axis, respondents from countries have directly been affected by the waves of mass migration, considered migration as a crucial problem or refused migrants more likely (Malta, Greece, Cyprus, Italy) than respondents from other countries. Furthermore, we found a clear distinction based on the political axis: countries not affected directly by the recent migration crisis and led by right-wing governments formed more negative and aversive attitudes towards migrants (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Latvia). In the majority of the examined countries an inner political axis exists as well: most strongly in France, England and Germany, supporters of right-wing parties tended to form negative attitudes toward refugees much more likely than their left-wing supporter counterparts.

The regional comparison of the perceived level of fear and welfare chauvinism showed that the Visegrad countries shared the same values on the migration-related threat, except for Poland to some extent in autumn 2015. In Poland the perceived level of migration related threat (both realistic and abstract fears) was measured to be the least strong, compared to Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. The level of welfare chauvinism –assessed from an economic, cultural and social perspective– was the highest in the Czech Republic and the lowest in Poland. The ranking of the different aspects is the same in all countries except for Poland: while the threat connected to the way of life (social aspect) was perceived to be the largest, the threat connected to labor shortage (economic aspect) was the lowest in Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic as well.

Focusing on Hungary, we measured an increased level of refusal in January 2016 as compared to the levels found in October, 2015, in line with the increasing levels of xenophobia we assessed the socio-demographic predictors of anti-immigrant sentiments.