The paper is dealing with the topic of national identity how it has changed in Hungary during the last decade. In 1995 Hungary was participating in the cross-national survey of the International Social Survey program focusing on the question of national identity, the attitudes toward the national in-group, ethnocentrism, nationalism and xenophobia. There have been several articles that have discussed the results of the 1995 study in Hungary as well as abroad. Based on these publications, it was obvious that the psychological reserves of national feeling and imagination had not been exhausted, either in the western or the eastern parts of the world. It was clear that in the Eastern European countries, not only had national identity survived the 40 years of state socialism, but in fact it had grown stronger, since the previously absent framework of a nation-state had been created. The results of the study showed that globalization had not affected the various formations and mutations of national identity. The publications were in accord with the events in the world in the decades before the turn of the millennium, and provided convincing evidence that the researchers had made the right decision in 1995, and had interpreted the results correctly. This success motivated the international research team to repeat the survey with the original questionnaire in each of the countries. This took place in 2003. This study is aimed at comparing the 1995 and 2003 Hungarian data. Since the questionnaires used both times were identical, comparison will allow us to show the way in which the cognitive and affective structure determining nationalist attitudes in Hungarian society have changed during this time.

The paper has three major parts: the first part deals with nationalism in Hungary in 1995 and 2003, the second part with the cognitive background of nationalism, and the third part with the connection between xenophobia and nationalism.
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TÁRKI
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Introduction

For decades representative samples of people have been surveyed all over the world about various political, economic or social issues—and all based on similar principles. In sequences of studies researchers from different countries have allowed each other to use their data, by which wonderful comparisons could be made, since the same questionnaire is filled out in 20 or 25 different countries. In addition, the individual topics may come up repeatedly in research programmes. This way trend analysis is made possible.

It was in the 1980s that Hungary joined the study sequence conducted in the framework of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). In 1995 it focused on the topic of national identity. This choice of topic had been preceded by lengthy preparation, which can be explained by the exceptional complexity of the topic of national identity. The questionnaire was finally prepared with the agreement of all participating countries. There was only one question on which the international research team did not accept the position of the Hungarian researchers, and this question was left out of the 1995 survey. ‘Descent’ was not included as a criterion for belonging to a national group, since most researchers did not consider it politically correct to bring up the issue of blood relationships.

There have been several books and articles that have discussed the results of the 1995 study in Hungary as well as abroad. Based on these publications, it was obvious that the psychological reserves of national feeling and imagination had not been exhausted, either in the western or the eastern parts of the world. It was clear that in the Eastern European countries, not only had national identity survived the 40 years of state socialism, but in fact it had grown stronger, since the previously absent framework of a nation-state had been created. The results of the study showed that globalization had not affected the various formations and mutations of national identity. The publications were in accord with the events in the world in the decades before the turn of the millennium, and provided convincing evidence that the researchers had made the right decision in 1995, and had interpreted the results correctly.

This success motivated the international research team to repeat the survey with the original questionnaire in each of the countries. This took

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1 It is important to mention Marcel Coenders’s book from the literature (Coenders 2001), as well as one of the most recent issues of the Journal of the International Society of Political Psychology, which was completely devoted to the topic (JISPP 2003). An article on this topic by the authors entitled ‘International Comparative Investigation into the National Identity’ was published in the journal Review of Sociology (Csepeli and Örkény 1999).
place in 2003. The change in the spirit of the time was shown by the fact that at the Chicago conference the researchers added, without protest, the question concerning ‘descent’. This question has a tremendous importance in the origin of the concept of nation, and its background psychological mechanisms (Csepeli 1992).

This study is aimed at comparing the 1995 and 2003 Hungarian data. Since the questionnaires used both times were identical, comparison will allow us to show the way in which the cognitive and affective structure determining nationalist attitudes in Hungarian society have changed during this time.

**Nationalism in Hungary in 1995 and 2003**

There was little significant change in nationalism between 1995 and 2003. It would have been surprising if there had been, since nationalist ideas are not the product of an individual, but are rather part of a person’s social identity, and this way they make possible the interpretation of a socially constructed reality. **Figure 1** shows the way the aggregated measure obtained from the four statements gauging nationalist attitudes turned out in the two periods examined.

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2 The following countries participated in the 1995 study: Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Germany (eastern and western parts), Great Britain, Holland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United States. The list of countries participating in the 2003 study is not available yet.

3 The only difference is the question of ‘decent’ mentioned above, which we could not ask in 1995, but have asked in 2003.

4 The comparison was made the following way. First the data in connection to various cognitive and affective elements of national identity that were reducible to ideological sources were reduced to seven variables, and then we checked how the individual variables lead to nationalist attitude basically determining the content of national identity.
Figure 1: Nationalism in Hungary in 1995 and 2003

Notes: The following statements were taken as the basis of the aggregated value of nationalism:

‘Hungary should restrict foreign imports in order to protect its economy.’
‘Hungary should follow her own interests, even if it brings her into conflict with other countries.’
‘Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in Hungary.’
‘Hungarian television should give priority to Hungarian films and shows.’

Aggregation was carried out by simple addition, which was then transformed on a 100-point graded scale. The figure shows the frequency of identification with nationalism. Y-axis represents the sample frequencies, and the X-axis the strength of aggregated nationalist attitude in percentage.

Figure 1 shows that the level of nationalism may be considered high in both time periods, and that there has been little change over the intervening eight years. The broad social acceptance, and open display, of nationalism shown by our data is, however, not a self-explanatory phenomenon, especially if we compare the Hungarian data to nationalist engagement abroad. Whereas the data from 1995 show that two-thirds of Hungarians explicitly identify with the argumentation of nationalist ideology, in Holland, for instance, the figure was only 15 per cent, in Norway 27 per cent, in Italy 28 per cent, and in Sweden 33 per cent. There are, of course, instances of the widespread popularity of nationalism in Western countries as well. A typical case is Austria, where 58 per cent of respondents can be characterized as strong nationalists, or Ireland (50 per cent), Australia (57 per cent), and the USA (45 per cent). Central and Eastern Europe is dominated by a nationalist feeling, similar to that in Hungary, which becomes even stronger as we
move further towards the east: the least nationalistic are those living in the eastern half of Germany—although, in their case, at 37 per cent, the proportion is well above the western part of Germany with 22 per cent; the highest value was found in Bulgaria (82 per cent), and Russia (73 per cent).

In Hungary, nationalism is little explained by factors of gender, socioeconomic status, or place of residence. In both of the periods examined, the highest effect that could be observed was that of the respondent’s age. The older a person is, the greater the tendency to accept nationalistic views; whereas among younger people the occurrence of nationalism is significantly lower.

At the same time, there is a very weak status effect; to wit, a nationalistic attitude is more frequent in people with lower status, and this relationship weakens as we move up the status ladder.\footnote{The international standard questionnaire allows little scope for fine-tuning the status variable. The variable we produced was built up of education, income and subjective experience of status. The three variables fitted one factor at an acceptable level.}

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Table 1: Socio-demographic variables explaining nationalism in 1995 and in 2003 (beta values in linear regression)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variable</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<tr>
<td>Size of settlement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Status</td>
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<td>Adjusted R²</td>
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</tbody>
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\textit{Note}: Beta coefficients in italics are significant.

The most interesting thing is nevertheless that, compared to 1995, by 2003 the explanatory power of socio-demographic variables had radically decreased. The diminution of the effects of age and status suggests that the social context of nationalist ideology has completely changed, and the acceptance or rejection of nationalistic views by 2003 had become sociologically interpretable not so much along (structural) social divisions, but rather in the context of value preferences.
Figure 2: Cognitive pathways to nationalism in 1995

```
 Nation-state
  +0.28 +0.12 +0.19 +0.35
    +0.13
 +0.13 +0.27
 -0.14
 Nation-culture

 Pride
 hard
 +0.27

 Pride
 soft

 Ethnocentrism
 +0.23 +0.26

 Nationalism
 0.86

 Xenophobia
 +0.13
```
The cognitive background of nationalism

In order to reveal the emotions and the value system motivating nationalism, we constructed a multi-variable cognitive space, in which, by means of a regressive pathway model, the interconnections of thought patterns and their hierarchies could be described. Figure 2 describes the cognitive paths yielding nationalism in the respondents’ emotional world and imagination in 1995. Following this, we shall discuss whether this source of the nationalistic value system and emotions had changed by 2003.

Our point of departure is that national identity had two variants in the sample. The task of the respondents was to define the criteria by which they accepted someone as a member of their own national group. We assumed that this allowed us to draw conclusions about the way the individual structures his/her own national identity.

In one version, belonging to a national group is based on citizenship, being born in a place, or living there, as well as an attachment to legal-political institutions (nation-state identity). In the other version the first language, as well as self-categorization, defines national identity according to the respondent (nation-culture identity). As Figure 2 shows, there is no strict division between the two versions. There seems to be a correlation between the two models ($r^2 = 0.27$). The model of identity, however, determines the ideological content of the national pride experienced. On the basis of nation-state identity the ‘hard’ contents of national pride appear (such as economic performance, working of democracy, human rights, and the extent of the welfare system). In contrast, the nation-culture identity favours the ‘soft’ domains of national pride (culture, history). These two types of pride are related to each other positively, of course, and one does not exclude the other. ‘Soft’ pride, however, may turn into nationalism only through ‘hard’ pride. From ‘hard’ pride there are two paths leading towards nationalism. The first one reaches nationalism via ethnocentrism. It is not surprising that one can reach nationalism from ethnocentrism via the circuitous route of xenophobia. The other pathway leads to nationalism via resistance to xenophobia. This path focuses on the tension that exists between national pride and nationalism: if an individual experiences the ‘hard’ version of national pride built upon the civic and modernist European value system, if he/she is not ethnocentric, or, in other words, does not value his/her own ethnic group unilaterally higher than other groups, then this makes it probable that that individual will reject discrimination against otherness, or foreignness, and this will save him/her from the excesses of nationalism.

Another interesting quality of the pathway model is that, whereas from the nation-culture identity there not even an indirect cognitive pathway
towards nationalism, from the nation-state identity there is one direct and three indirect paths. One path is mediated by ethnocentrism, the other by xenophobia, and the third by ‘hard’ pride (in connection with ethnocentrism), and all three of them lead towards nationalism.

This result was interpreted in 1995 as the modernist development of Hungarian national identity. According to our interpretation, in the definition of national identity, citizenship became the first criterion, as opposed to the popular interpretative framework of the past, which was the nation-culture identity. According to the latter, those who felt themselves to be Hungarian, or who spoke Hungarian, were accepted as Hungarian. The fixation on citizenship, however, has proved to be double-faced. At the turn of the century, one face of the Hungarian national identity is in accordance with human rights, and finds national identity in the discourse of tolerance and rationality. This version may be called constitutional patriotism. The other face, however, as the emotional reservoir of the modern category of citizenship, uses xenophobia and ethnocentrism (most probably drawing on the national cultural rhetoric of national pride). This version is called by Habermas (1996) ‘welfare chauvinism’, suggesting that in modern welfare states several privileges go hand in hand with citizenship, and it is the jealous guarding of these that results in xenophobia and ethnocentrism.

The nation-state identity based on ‘welfare chauvinism’ is not unknown in Western Europe, but it permeates society to a much lesser degree. This is also proof that in Western European countries the explanatory value of socio-economic variables differs greatly from that of the Eastern European or Hungarian sample: in contrast to our region, where status differences do not play an important role in the penetration of nationalist feeling, in the West we find a particularly strong status effect. It follows, then, that the lower, deprived or vulnerable strata of society have a strong nationalist attitude, which is probably based on their own vulnerability, and especially the fear of foreigners and people from other countries.

The other important difference is in the cognitive field, which contains and maintains nationalism. On the one hand, the model identical to the one analysed for the Hungarian population influences the spread of nationalism with exceptional force (values of the adjusted R² are between 30 and 50 per cent⁶). This suggests that western nationalism is rooted in a group of extreme ideas, in which ethnocentrism is paired with xenophobia, the idea of the nation-state, and a pride fuelled by a feeling of cultural-linguistic superiority. It is important to note that the most important cognitive prerequisite for nationalism is the rejection of foreigners, or xenophobia. (As we shall see,

⁶ The only exceptions to this are Ireland and Italy, where this value is lower, although still higher than the one characterizing Hungary.
Another typical symptom of ‘welfare chauvinism’ is that in the western part of Germany, and especially in Austria, the nationalist idea is closely tied to the overemphasized idea of nation-state. At the back of this there seems to be an anxiety for the nation or for the cohesion of the nation because of migration. (In Austria, for example, emphasis of the nation-state is the major source of nationalism.)

After this, it is hardly surprising that ‘hard’ pride does not play an important role in the development of nationalism in the West, or if it does, as in the USA, then it is in a mutually exclusive way. Therefore, the less proud one is of one’s country for reasons of modernism and democracy, the stronger one will identify with the classical themes of nationalism. A similar conclusion may be drawn about the western part of Germany: the less one is proud of the ‘hard things’—that is, of the democratic political system, the performance of the country, the respect for human rights, and the achievements of the welfare system—the more one is going to identify with nationalistic ideas.

According to the results of the study repeated after eight years, the modernization of the Hungarian national identity has been continuing, while memory of the past has also revived.

The cultural national identity and nation-state identity still show a positive correlation, but this time, in 2003, the relationship was much stronger (Figure 3). (Overall the explanatory value of the path model is higher, which shows that against a background of nationalist feeling, crystallization of the interconnection between certain cognitive elements has continued.) The relationship between nation-state identity and ‘hard’ pride has grown stronger. There was no change in the paths leading from nation-state identity through ethnocentrism and xenophobia towards nationalism, but the relationships have intensified. This suggests that the reserves of nation-state identity rooted in welfare chauvinism continued to expand between 1995 and 2003. The negative relationship between ‘hard’ pride and xenophobia remained, while the path leading from nation-state identity to ‘hard’ pride has deepened. The most important new finding of the 2003 pathway model is the rebirth of the cultural national identity.7

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7 In the course of the 2003 study we asked about the ‘descent’ variable among the factors determining national membership. According to 45 per cent of respondents descent was very important, and 33 per cent thought it was important in the definition of membership of a nation. By contrast, 16 per cent thought it was not very important, and five per cent thought it was not important at all to include ‘descent’ in the definition.
Figure 3: The cognitive path leading to nationalism in 2003
Population loss and assimilation

The cognitive changes related to the idea of nation that are at work behind nationalism draw the researcher’s attention to the less obvious fact that today the nationalist thinking relates more and more to what we think of ‘otherness’ and foreigners. This is reasonable, because by 2003, of all the variables we measured, xenophobia was the one that best explains nationalism, thus leaving behind ethnocentric attitudes, or patriotism rooted in traditionalism. To clarify this problem, we have revised the inner contents of the concept of xenophobia and in this light reconsidered what happened between 1995 and 2003.

In the study, we asked what people thought about minorities living in Hungary (domestic minorities): whether they wanted to assimilate and integrate those minorities, or just the opposite, to preserve the many colours of society, support the preservation and maintenance of cultural differences between minorities. The results suggest that attitudes towards foreigners (immigrants) are closely related to what we think about our own domestic minorities. If, however, we differentiate the two and describe one attitude towards minorities and otherness, and another attitude towards strictly legally and politically defined foreigners and immigrants, then the time factor shows a significant difference (Figure 4).

The direction of the relationship between the intermediate variables of the pathway models must be defined unambiguously. Since behind rejection of ‘otherness’ there lurk hostile feelings towards minorities, whether they arrive from outside the country or form a domestic minority, it is difficult to decide if the emotions towards the domestic minority determine feelings towards foreigners or the other way round. This was one of the reasons we decided to try to separate two bunches of attitudes related to ‘otherness’ in a way that would eliminate from the model the common feelings towards both types of minority. The other reason for separating the two groups was that we did not want to make the model seem as though it fitted the data better than it did in reality. Since if emotions towards national and foreign minorities are related, then the pathway between them would increase the coherence of the model. We have solved this problem by filtering out the effect of feelings towards Hungarian minorities from the formation of opinions towards foreign minorities; that is, we filtered out opinions that were derived from a general rejection of ‘otherness’. This effect was controlled by defining emotions towards foreigners as a dependent variable, and the acceptance, or rejection, of Hungarian minorities as an independent variable in a linear regression model. The residual of the model, which only contained the emotions towards foreigners that were independent of attitudes towards Hungarian minorities, then became the variable for the path model.
Figure 4: Xenophobia and nationalism in 1995 and 2003
While, against the background of nationalism, the two factors have an almost equal weight, xenophobic views on foreign immigrants have softened a great deal in the past eight years, whereas towards the domestic minorities (above all the Roma minority) they have hardened. Ethnocentrism has a crucial role to play in the path towards nationalism. There is no use in reducing hostility towards immigrants if ethnocentrism has increased in the past eight years. The feeling of cultural superiority is the best soil in which to strive to assimilate Hungarian minorities, and in which to reject foreigners. The rejection of ‘otherness’—either towards national or foreign minorities—equally supports the preservation of nationalism. Traditional patriotism is also a breeding ground for ethnocentrism—though it does decrease with time—which leads, via simple or more complex paths, towards nationalism.

This whole contradiction may be resolved, from a socio-psychological point of view, if the decline in the nation’s birth rate, with the concomitant of an inactive, ageing population, can mobilize public opinion. For the only way of solving the problem is through immigration. It is encouraging that the majority of the population has strong expectations of the assimilation of immigrants, whom it does not want to see as minorities for any length of time.

Summary

The eight years that passed between the two studies were evidently enough for the idea of being a Hungarian defined by language use and attitude to be paired up with ethnocentrism and xenophobia to become a source of nationalism. At the same time, the modernization of national identity based on welfare chauvinism continued, and constitutional patriotism also gained momentum.

The two snapshots of Hungarian nationalism taken eight years apart show that the boundaries between the two identity models of nation-state and culture-state have softened. In comparison with the earlier situation the competition of cognitive affective models—that are capable of interpreting the socially constructed reality on a national basis—have become more intense, and the competition field has even broadened. The question is, now that Hungary has joined the European Union, which version of the reconstructed Hungarian identity will reach the finishing line?
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