Abstract

One of the most widely discussed and perhaps most sensitive questions concerning the eastwards enlargement of the European Union is that of labour force migration. Our main goal in this paper is to address the question of whether the increased membership of the EU will really result in mass labour migration from Eastern Europe, including Hungary.

First, we review the possible ways of estimating East–West migration in Europe. In the second section we investigate the volume, defining directions and social basis for outward movement from Hungary. In the concluding section we assess the short-term and long-term opportunities for Hungarian employees opened up by the recent expansion of the EU.

From the point of view of medium- and long-term possibilities, based on the likely timescales for free labour movement coming into effect, it is possible to sketch three scenarios:

(1) Free movement of labour is not introduced (a waiting period of a maximum of seven years) and a selective migration policy comes into effect.
In this case migration will be regulated by the demands and preferences of the labour markets in the more developed EU countries. Selection will focus on skilled workers, young people with degrees, and those carrying out specialist services.

(2) Free movement of labour is not introduced, and yet no selective migration policy comes into effect. (The transitional period may be shortened.) Migration will take place for a short period following the point of accession, at which time a certain—temporary—increase is to be expected in the migration trend.

(3) Free movement of labour is introduced after seven years. During the long waiting period the process of catch-up will have continued in the economy, and established channels of employment will have had a chance to develop. These factors are likely to reduce the inclination to migrate.
Authors:

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TÁRKI
Budapest, 2005
One of the most widely discussed and perhaps most sensitive questions concerning the eastwards enlargement of the European Union is that of labour force migration. One possible consequence of the substantial differences in income between the labour markets of the new-accession and the old EU member states, together with the free circulation of labour, could be an invasion of migrants from Eastern Europe. Our main goal in this paper is to address the question of whether the increased membership of the EU will really result in mass labour migration from Eastern Europe, including Hungary.

First, we shall review the possible ways of estimating East–West migration in Europe and the inherent problems. Then we shall present an analytic framework that can be used to estimate the likely evolution of migration. In the second section we will investigate the volume, defining directions and social basis for outward movement from Hungary—principally to the old EU member states. In the concluding section we assess the short-term and long-term opportunities for Hungarian employees opened up by the recent expansion of the EU.

Methods of estimating East–West migration in Europe and its analytic framework

Estimating methods

One of the defining questions addressed by a large volume of migration research over the past 15 years has been quantification and estimation of the likely scale of East–West migration (Hönekopp 1999; Layard et al. 1992; Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller 1996; Wallace 1998). In the new millennium it has been the likely migrational impact of enlargement that has rather become the focus of research (e.g. Boeri and Brücker 2000; Hille and Straubhaar 2001; Blanchard 2001; Biffl 2001; Fertig and Schmidt 2002; Dustmann et al. 2003; Behir, Fontagné and Zanghieri 2003).

Comparisons of the projection methodologies (guesstimations, econometric models, extrapolation from prior experience, surveys), with their different results, are compiled in Table A1 in the Appendix. An important lesson that we take from these studies is that it is essential to develop an analytic framework for forecasting migration, in which assumptions are suffi-
ciently graded for the migrational processes to be adequately described and analysed.

Alecke, Huber and Untiedt (2001) wittily demonstrate the importance of factors which, in general, are not taken into account in the projections: the standard estimates essentially take the differentials in per capita GDP to be the motor of international migration. Analysing the so-called ‘gravitational models’, they first test the question of how good the estimates of potential migration really are and, secondly, ask whether it is in general possible to predict potential migration. They compare the actual effect of German reunification and the southern expansion of the European Union with the values produced using the normal predictive models. The estimates based on the usual models base the potential migration exclusively on income (or wage) differentials, ignoring other important microeconomic factors that limit the size of migration. According to Alecke and colleagues, it is the factors influencing not the dynamic of migration, but its size and rate, that are typically left out of consideration. On the basis of such arguments, they maintain that, both in the case of the German example and in the southern expansion of the EU, the scale of migration was considerably overestimated. Neither do the gravitational models generally take into account the differing time periods of migration. They typically deal with more permanent migration, which is easier to assess, than with the brief, commuting migration, which is more difficult for the economic models to capture.

The analytic framework used to estimate the likely development of migration

A considerable portion of European migration does not correspond to long-distance migration, but rather to seasonal employment, or often in the border regions to commuting, and this is also likely to be the case for Hungary (Sik 2002; Fóti 2003). It appears, then, that in this case models based on macro data or sophisticated simulations cannot be effective in predicting migration. We can learn more from the analysis of a destructured, descriptive model of migration in the form of a matrix with many elements (Table 1). Using the anticipated changes in the individual elements of the model, we can graphically describe the likely trends in any migration.
Table 1: Indicators applicable to the estimation of the scale of migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors stimulating or slowing migration</th>
<th>Indicators on the basis of time horizon</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Short-term, commuter migration (i)</td>
<td>Long-term, permanent migration (p)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Indicator of differentials of wages and standard of living (W)</td>
<td>Wage differential (at exchange rate) $W_i$</td>
<td>Standard of living differentials: GDP equivalent purchasing power $W_p$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Risk (Rk)</td>
<td>A large income (profit) to compensate for the risk, and the risk is small $R_k$</td>
<td>The expected pension of the domestic economy (growth in GDP, unemployment, likelihood of job opportunities, sophistication of the insurance systems, security of life) $R_{k_p}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Migrant networks (N)</td>
<td>State of the population/workforce abroad, based on the network of historical/ethnic relations (earlier waves of migration, the presence or absence of a diaspora) $N_i$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Economic regulation (S)</td>
<td>The size of the general taxation burden in the sending country—the size of the black economy in the receiving country $S_i$</td>
<td>The degree of protectionism in the labour market of the receiving country $S_p$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Migration policy (P)</td>
<td>Is it permissive, selective, restrictive? What does it restrain, what does it promote, does it restrict the free movement of labour? (2+3+2 years)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In the case of the element $R_k$, the household’s migrational strategy should be conceived as a portfolio in which the migration of members of the household is a means of getting around local uncertainties and ensuring a better long-term existence for the household. (Massey et al. 1993)
Migration from Hungary to the old EU member states

So far, following expansions of the European Union, the scale of migration to the previous ‘old’ EU—according to all sources—has been modest. Let us postulate that:

- without significant political or economic change, this will essentially remain the same;
- demographic conditions, in both the EU and Hungary, will not change suddenly (both being characterized by a fall in the proportion of the ageing and active age groups);
- nevertheless, the possibility of the free movement of labour could, for a time (for a section of the population, and with people following a ‘well-beaten path’ to certain regions), produce a temporarily increased migrationary pressure—through a surplus of labour (Blanchard 2001);
- the present situation is characterized by strict EU control of migration. This is not new, however, but the continuation of a trend that has been operating for almost a decade. As shown in Figure 1, at the beginning of the 1990s migrational control was weak, but then the growing level of migration suddenly fell due to the effect of the tight regulation that followed.

In order to establish the expected effects of migration on the labour market, we need to know not only the degree of migration potential, but also its target and its socio-demographic composition.

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3 We can look to the experiences of the southern European countries for further help in predicting the development of migrational trends. In the case of Italy, and later Spain, Portugal and Greece, we see that the community countries reacted with fear to the free movement of labour, but with the opportunity for this free movement, actual migration—contrary to every expectation—began to fall in every case. Positive discrimination (the tightening up of migration from non-member countries) did not stimulate Italian emigration, nor did the proportion of Italian citizens resident in other member countries increase. The migrational trend of Italian workers proved to be independent of the regulation of the free movement of labour by the European Community. Greece joined the European Community in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1987. The free movement of labour only came into effect for these countries after an additional waiting period: for Greece from 1986 and for the two other countries from 1992. The possibility of free labour movement did not break the trend started in 1974–75. In the case of Greece, in the 1990s the trend for low levels of emigration and low levels of repatriation was consolidated; Portugal remained unchanged as a country of substantial emigration, but the movement could be better termed as employment abroad for a fixed period of time. Neither did the free movement of labour significantly influence the target of migration. (Hárs 1995)
Figure 1: Net migration in the European Union, 1990–1997

Note: The figure does not cover the whole of the European Union: there are no corresponding data available for Austria, France, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The Central and Eastern European 10 states: Romania, Poland, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.

Sources: Hönekopp (1999), EUROSTAT, Council of Europe data and authors’ own calculations.

The volume of migration

In the 1990s, Hungarian migration potential was low in comparison to other Central and Eastern European countries (Figure 2). In the four timescales under investigation, Hungarians had the lowest score in Central and Eastern Europe. Comparable migration potential data for Central and Eastern Europe in the new millennium strengthen this tendency, in that, regionally,
Hungarian migration potential is relatively low, at a level roughly equivalent to the Czech Republic (Figure 3).

Figure 2: The measure of migration potential—the proportion of people who intend to go abroad for the given time period, 1998 (%)

Table 2: The types of TÁRKI gross migration potential* and the measure of total migration potential between 1993 and 2003 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time of the survey (N of cases)</th>
<th>Short-term foreign employment</th>
<th>Long-term foreign employment</th>
<th>Emigration</th>
<th>Total migration potential**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993 (N=3978)</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994 (N=3760)</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997 (N=2848)</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001 (N=1503)</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 (N=1011)</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 (N=1030)</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *The gross migration potential indicates what proportion of the population questioned plans to work abroad for the short term (some weeks or months) or long term (some years) or plans to emigrate (Sik and Simonovits 2002).

**The total migration potential is a composite indicator containing all instances of intention to work abroad, short term or long term, or to emigrate.

Source: László, Sik and Simonovits (2003), Simonovits (2004)
Looking at the evolution in time of migration potential (Table 2) we see that, compared to the situation in the 1990s, the chances that someone would go abroad to work roughly doubled after 2000. In 2003, three measurements of migration potential were carried out, using three different techniques:

- According to the results of the March ISSP (International Social Survey Programme)\(^7\) that measured movement potential, 11 per cent of people were prepared to change their place of residence within Europe (which largely tallies with the post-2000 data for total migration potential), and 6 per cent were prepared to move to other continents (Sik 2003b).

- According to the data in the 2003 Labour Force Survey of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (HCSO), a total of 4 per cent of those aged 15–74 were considering, in the broadest sense, taking work abroad (Hárs 2004). Within this group, 1.9 per cent had a weak intention to migrate, 1.5 per cent a medium intention, and 0.5 per cent a strong intention. Projecting these figures onto the entire population aged between 15 and 74 suggests that altogether 300,000 plan some kind of migration; of these, 144,000 have not yet taken any steps, 122,000 have collected information about migrating, and 35,000 have made actual preparations for taking a job abroad.

\(^7\) The TÁRKI Omnibus 2003 March survey questionnaire contained the ISSP-survey question block.
According to an EU source, 11.3 per cent of qualified Hungarians, Czechs and Slovaks, taken together, plan to live or work within five years in the old EU member states (EU-15), though only 1.1 per cent plan to settle there (Migration ... 2004).

Table A2 in the Appendix pulls together the available estimates of migration potential.

The planned target of migration

Between 1993 and 2002 the planned migration target did not change. This is probably simply the continuation of a long-standing trend governed by historical and geographical considerations. First and foremost, Hungarians seek to realize their worth on the German and Austrian labour markets, while the most common planned destination for emigration, besides these two countries, is the USA.8

Looking at the target of migration potential with respect to length of time of migration, the 2001 and 2002 data both show that the German–Austrian domination holds firm in all three migration types (Table 3). Aside from Germany and Austria, in 2001 the USA and the large Western European countries had significant roles as a destination for short-term employment, the USA and Italy for long-term employment, and for emigration these two countries and Australia were the most significant. For those contemplating the more serious decision to emigrate, however, target countries other than the most important destination countries are considered in earnest. This indicates that plans for long-term employment and emigration are much more likely to be ‘customized’ than is the case for short-term employment, in which the migration shell appears to be formed of existing contacts and to be based on previous personal experience.9

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8 In 1993, of those planning short- or long-term employment abroad, 59 per cent and 54 per cent would go to Germany and Austria respectively (countries with smaller proportions were: the United Kingdom, USA, France, Switzerland and Italy). By 1994 the German–Austrian domination had fallen somewhat, so that these two countries were attracting 54 per cent and 49 per cent, respectively, of those looking for short- and long-term employment.

9 The 1997 survey provided evidence that the migration target was broadly similar to the migration target of the subjects’ migration shell. (Sik 1999a) The migration intentions remained similar over the generations (a study carried out among secondary school students demonstrates the extent to which the primary target for taking employment abroad is Germany: see Diósi (1999)). For the ingrained effect of the migration shell on migration potential among Hungarians of the Carpathian Basin, see Simonovits (2003).
Table 3: The gross and combined migration potential targets for all time periods in 2001 and 2002, as a percentage of the total countries selected

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination country</th>
<th>Short-term employment abroad</th>
<th>Long-term employment abroad</th>
<th>Emigration</th>
<th>Combined migration potential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (N)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing the 2001 and 2002 data, it can be seen that there is no significant change in the target destinations for short- and long-term employment: the Western European countries, and within these the German-speaking countries, continue to lead, and they show a small growth in this respect. In the case of emigration intentions, however, the picture is different: Germany shows the same small growth, while Austria shows a very significant decline (the proportion halving); growth is most noticeable for the UK and France. If, however, we divide the planned emigration destinations between European and non-European countries, we find no significant difference between the 2001 and 2002 figures. Neither do we find a significant difference in combined migration potential, either for countries or for continents.

The 2001 CEORG data (which did not specify the length of the planned employment, and limited the targets of migration potential to the European Union countries) showed that Hungarians intended to find work principally on the German and Austrian labour markets, with the UK also standing out among other European countries.

The social basis for migration potential

The social and demographic characteristics of migration potential—ignoring the influence of educational level—can be seen as constant. There is a general tendency for men, the younger age groups, the unemployed, students, the Roma population, and the inhabitants of the Western areas of Hungary to be more inclined to take work abroad. The level of education does not affect migration potential in a linear or a substantial way. In 2001, the proportion of those planning to take work in the EU rose in line with educational achievement, up to the level of secondary vocational school. However, the migration potential of those who graduated from a grammar school, college or university was only average. By contrast, the 2003 TÁRKI study found that the level of education did not have any appreciable influence on intentions to find work abroad (Sik 2003b).

The most recent studies also establish the important role in migration decisions of various elements of migration-specific human and relationship capital, mentioned previously (which we term the migration shell) (Sik and Simonovits 2003). Among the indicators of human capital, the most important is unequivocally that of knowledge of a foreign language: the inclination to migrate for those who know a foreign language is two or three times greater than average. Besides this—primarily if long-term employment is being considered—a limited role is also played by previous migration experience.

The 2003 Labour Force Survey reinforces the results of the TÁRKI studies, both as regards demographics and migration-specific human and relationship capital. Looking at the effect of age, it can be stated that the migration intentions of the under-30s are more than double the average. It is also clearly shown, in accord with previous data, that the inclination of men to migrate is substantially stronger than that of women, and that language knowledge and previous work experience have an influence on migration. If we look at activity on the labour market, the unemployed are three times more likely than average to consider taking a job abroad to be ‘conceivable action’, although there is less evidence of this trend at the level of serious concrete planning. Level of education is not a significant factor among those who achieve more than the basic eight years of primary education, where migration potential stands at between four and six per cent; for those whose educational achievement is at or below the basic eight years, the migration potential is lower (2.2 per cent and 0.5 per cent, respectively). The effect of regional differences corresponds to previous experience in that the two regions west of the Danube (Western and Southern Transdanubia) had the highest migration intentions, while the Northern Great Plain had the lowest ( Hárs 2004).
Conclusions

We will now attempt to answer the question of the extent to which accession to the EU will create a new situation and lead to new opportunities for Hungarian workers, in the short and the long term.

Since, of the EU member states, only Ireland and the UK have created the institutional conditions for the free movement of labour, it follows that only in these two countries will employment opportunities be increased. Theoretically, given that only two of the fifteen EU member states have opened up their labour markets, this could result in a realignment of the planned migration targets for Hungary and the other accession countries.

It is also possible that the proportion preparing to go to the UK will increase, but—as we have already seen—besides the objective conditions for finding work, individual factors play an important role in migration decisions. The greater geographical distance and the language barrier will mean that migration to the UK is still not a genuine possibility for most of those planning migration, although certain groups—principally the better qualified and those with greater relationship and human capital—can expect a growing level of migration. Also it seems possible that, although Ireland did not figure among the primary target destinations of Hungarians, the number of those considering working in Ireland may grow thanks to the free movement of labour, but we cannot offer an estimate for the volume of growth. As for the most popular destinations for Hungarians—Austria and Germany—they will probably continue the migration trend shown previously. In the case of Austria, commuting in the border regions may increase to some extent thanks to easier border crossing.

From the point of view of medium- and long-term possibilities, changes in the regulation of the labour market will be of decisive significance. Based on the likely timescales for free labour movement coming into effect, it is possible to sketch three scenarios:

(1) Free movement of labour is not introduced (a waiting period of a maximum of seven years) and a selective migration policy comes into effect.

In this case migration will be regulated by the demands and preferences of the labour markets in the more developed EU countries. Economic and political preferences will similarly lend support to a selective migration policy (Bauer and Zimmermann 2000). In the framework of bilateral agreements, employment is determined according to the demands of the labour market of the receiving country, and this will then continue to be the migration framework (Hárs 2003). Selection will focus on skilled workers, young people with degrees, and those carrying out specialist services. As a consequence of this, skills shortages may arise in the sending country, although the experience of qualified migrants returning to their country will constitute an asset
of migration. Also the rise of virtual workplaces (employment at a distance via the internet) may lead to a decrease in the migration of qualified labour.

(2) Free movement of labour is not introduced, and yet no selective migration policy comes into effect. (The transitional period may be shortened.) Migration will take place for a short period following the point of accession, at which time a certain—temporary—increase is to be expected in the migration trend. The degree of increase will depend on how similar the migration framework is to the one sketched in the first scenario, since the labour markets of the destination countries will all favour skilled labour, young people with degrees, and those offering specialist services.

(3) Free movement of labour is introduced after seven years. During the long waiting period the process of catch-up will have continued in the economy, and established channels of employment will have had a chance to develop. These factors are likely to reduce the inclination to migrate (cf. the experience of the Southern European countries (Hárs 1995)).

In summing up, then, we can say that, from the point of view of Hungarian workers finding work abroad, joining the EU will in the short term not result in any significant changes, while in the long term the migration framework depends on the timescale of the introduction of the free movement of labour.

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Appendix

Table A1: Estimates of the size of East–West migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study, source</th>
<th>Order of size of estimate</th>
<th>Sending countries</th>
<th>Estimation method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Simple estimation, extrapolation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baldwin (1994)</td>
<td>5–10% of population</td>
<td>a) Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia</td>
<td>'Guesstimates' based on population figures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a) 2–6.6 million</td>
<td>b) 3.2–10.6 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimmermann (1996)</td>
<td>5–50 million people to Western Europe over 10–15 years</td>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe</td>
<td>'Guesstimates' based on population figures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt–Hogarth (1999)</td>
<td>A maximum of 41,000 annually into the EU</td>
<td>Estonia, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia</td>
<td>Extrapolation from 'Normal migration index' (the rate of migration for comparable citizens between 1985–1996) for a selection of Western European countries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 2) Estimation by econometric methods | | | |
| | b) 590,000 to 1.18 million annually into the EU | b) All countries waiting to join. | |


## The Labour Market and Migration: Threat or Opportunity?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study, source</th>
<th>Order of size of estimate</th>
<th>Sending countries</th>
<th>Estimation method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Layard et al. (1992)</td>
<td>130,000 annually to the West in general</td>
<td>Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia (originally the estimate was made for all Central and Eastern European countries)</td>
<td>Based on experiences of North–South migration (between 1950–1970 the studied emigration was 3% of the population concerned) Barro–Sala-I-Martin (1991, 1995) estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lundborg (1998)</td>
<td>628,000 workers to the EU or 1,885 million individuals (including family members) over 15 years, i.e. 126,000 individuals annually</td>
<td>The Baltic nations and Poland</td>
<td>According to the methodology of Layard et al. (1992) Barro–Sala-I-Martin (1991, 1995) estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter-skirchen–Dietz (1998)</td>
<td>Immigraion and commuting into Austria a) 42,000 b) 31,000 over 5 years: 150,000–200,000 immigrant workers, 150,000 expected to be permanently commuting</td>
<td>a) Poland, Hungary, b) Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia</td>
<td>Based on Brücker–Franzmeyer (1997) a) given free employment from 2005 and 2010 respectively Barro–Sala-I-Martin (1991, 1995) estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fassmann–Hintermann (1997)</td>
<td>a) 721,000 into the EU b) 320,000 into Germany c) 150,000 into Austria</td>
<td>Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia</td>
<td>Representative survey (Gallup (1996): population over 14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallace (1998)</td>
<td>No exact data for migration potential, only declarations of intended permanent and temporary (labour) migration</td>
<td>Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria (in addition Croatia, Yugoslavia, Ukraine and Belarus)</td>
<td>Representative survey (sample: approx. 1,000 people per country)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Hönekopp (2000), based on Alecke et al. (2001).*
Table A2: Estimates of likely migration from Hungary to the old EU member states with the imposition of conditions on the free movement of labour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Sending countries (the acceding Central and Eastern European countries)</th>
<th>Size of estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sik (1993–1997)</td>
<td>Representative survey (short- and long-term migration)</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>5–6% plan migration for some period of time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TÁRKI, Migration Potential, 2001, 2002</td>
<td>Representative survey (short- and long-term migration)</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>9–11% plan migration for some period of time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TÁRKI–CEORG, 2001–2002</td>
<td>Representative survey (intention to take work in the EU)</td>
<td>Hungary (Poland, Czech Republic)</td>
<td>12–14% are considering working abroad within the EU after accession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISSP, March 2003</td>
<td>Representative survey (regional identity and movement potential)</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>11% would gladly move to another European country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographic Research Institute HCSO, May 2003</td>
<td>Representative survey (migration potential and relationship capital)</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>6% would gladly move to another continent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCSO Labour Force Survey, 2003</td>
<td>Representative survey (distinguishing weak, medium and serious migration intentions)</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>3.9% (301,000) plan to take work abroad, among these: 0.5% (35,000) have a serious intention to migrate</td>
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Research Areas:
• social structure, labour market
• income distribution, poverty, inequalities
• social policy, welfare systems
• boom study, economic attitudes
• election research, market research
• survey methodology, statistical analyses
• microsimulation implementation

References:
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• international organizations
• professional organizations
• local councils
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